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This is a revised version of a paper first presented as 
"Authoritarian Expériences and the Prospects for Democracy", 
at the workshop on "Prospects for Democracy: Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule", sponsored by the Latin American program 
of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
September 1980. A subsequent draft with the same title as 
the present one was initially circulated as Working Paper No. 
60 (1980) of the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., but has 
been out of print now for several years.
In any case, this version has been substantially revised. 
Some of its themes and concepts will appear in essays 
contained in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and 
Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions From Authoritarian 
Rule, 4 vols. (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, forthcoming in 1985), especially in the fourth volume 
written by Guillermo O'Donnell and myself entitled Political 
Life After Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Transitions.
Despite repeated urgings by critics to divorce my 
speculations from those of Machiavelli, I have refused to do 
revised edition. I apologize to the reader for 
seem an excessive preoccupation with this 
Florentine. Incidentally, this intellectual
antedates my coming to the European University 
in Florence and, therefore, should not be
as a case of "ecological determinism" or 
nativism". My rediscovery of Machiavelli I owe in







large part to Elissa B. Weaver of the Department of Romance 
Languages of the University of Chicago. She has gently, but 
firmly, sought to keep me faithful to the original works and 
is, therefore, in no way responsible for the distortion and 






















































































































































































How and why do authoritarian regimes break down? Who are the 
agents, and what are the motives involved in the deterioration and 
eventual transformation of this mode of political domination? How 
do past experience with authoritarian rule and the circumstances 
of its demise affect future democratic performance? What are the 
processes of democratization which ensue from such a liberation of 
political forces? Which possible combination of actors and actions 
will best ensure a viable democratic outcome? What configuration 
of institutions and pattern of benefits are likely to emerge from 
such a transformation in regime type?
Not very long ago, the posing of such questions in the 
context of contemporary Latin American and Southern Europe would 
have been considered pura fantasia —  an imaginative exercise in 
political science fiction or a naive expression of wishful 
thinking. To the extent that scholars were explicitly concerned 
with regime-level questions at all, their attention was directed 
elsewhere. Most were preoccupied with delineating the 
interrelated (and presumably viable) properties of "bureaucratic- 
authoritarian rule" and/or with demonstrating the ineluctable 
imperatives for its emergence (and, putatively, its persistence) 
in the context of the regions' delayed, dependent, peripheral or 
semi-peripheral, capitalist development. A few were keeping busy 
explaining away the survival of rare democratic exceptions due to 




























































































Rather suddenly and quite unexpectedly, the above questions 
about regime transformation moved up on the agenda of public and 
elite attention from pura fantasia to, at least, possible 
relevancia and even, in a few places, to gran actualidad. 
Scholars, as usual responding belatedly and opportunistically to 
the demand for their services, found their recently acquired 
conceptual-cum-theoretical garments ill-fitting, if not ill- 
suited, to the task of explaining such an unanticipated outcome. 
Of course, there were hints scattered in the explanations of 
authoritarian rule about possible inconsistencies, unresolved 
dilemmas and eventual contradictions, and a case could be made 
that enough significant, if unexplained and unexpected, changes 
had occurred —  especially in the structure of the world economy—  
to account for the possibility of "necessary" regime 
transformation. Nevertheless, the mere prospect of a resurgence 
of democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe was enough to 
provoke an "agonizing reappraisal" of assumptions about the nature 
of the fit between regime type, class structure, economic 
development and international context in those parts of the world 
( 1 ) .
This intriging combination of practical urgency and 
theoretical embarassment no doubt motivated the decision of a 
group of scholars associated with the Latin American Program of 
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars to convoke a 
working group on the topic of "Prospects for Democracy: 




























































































contributed significantly to the previous discussion on 
"bureaucratic authoritarian regimes" —  and, it is only fair to 
point out, to the criticism of that paradigm (2). As a member of 
that group, I think it accurate to say that all of us felt that a 
re-examination of these themes required detailed analyses of the 
forces and factors involved in specific —  hopefully analogous —  
cases (past and present) of regime transformation toward
democracy, as well as speculative exploration of the general 
processes and generic issues raised by such transformations. On 
the one hand, we recognized that we needed much more information 
and insight about what had happened and was actually happening; on 
the other hand, we considered it necessary to attempt, even before 
the necessary empirical material was available, to identify what 
such instances and examples might have in common, and why their 
outcomes might be expected to differ.
Guillermo O'Donnell and I first drafted a loose problématique 
outlining relevant issues and themes (3). It was intended to 
attract attention t;o our joint venture and to elicit comments 
about its scope, content and approach. The statement also served 
to establish a tentative division of labor under which I was 
assigned the less savory, but more tractable, job of dealing with 
“ the "Demise of Authoritarian Rule", while Guillermo O'Donnell and
Adam Przeworski would engage in the more appetizing task of 






























































































When the above mentioned problématique was circulated among 
potential participants and other interested scholars, two 
responses particularly intrigued me: one perceptive critic 
accused it of being insufficiently Machiavellian —  perhaps for 
not having put theoretical speculation squarely and aggressively 
at the service of improving the prospect for a republican-cum- 
democratic outcome; a second, equally perceptive, critic charged 
that it was excessively Machiavellian —  perhaps for its 
assumption that political regimes are not merely given by culture 
or imposed by circumstance, but are willed and chosen into being. 
Whatever the merit of either or both of these accusations, their 
paradoxical message sent me scurring back to the Florentine 
master, first out of curiosity and, then, for edification.
For there I not only found considerable inspiration in 
substantive matters, but also a sober injunction "to consider 
carefully how human affairs proceed" (Discourses, II, 29, p. 342) 
(5) and, therefore, not to flinch from unpleasant conclusions. He 
also gave me the methodological tip that "one cannot give a 
definite rule concerning these matters without knowing the 
particular details of those states wherein one had to take a 
similar decision" and, therefore, if one did not know those 
details, the only way to proceed was by abstraction and deduction 
"in as general a manner as the subject matter will allow" (Prince, 
XX, 146). Finally, I received optimistic support for my implicitly 




























































































peoples there still exist and have always existed, the same
desires and passions. Thus it is an easy matter for him who
carefully examines past events to foresee future events in a
republic, or, if old remedies cannot be found, to devise new ones
based upon the similarity of the events" (Discourses, I, 39, 252).
Within the limits imposed by my lesser talents and by the 
subject matter itself (alas, new desires and passions, or better 
new ways of satisfying and frustrating ancient desires and 
passions, seem to have further complicated political life since he 
wrote in the early 1500s), I will attempt in this essay to be 
properly Machiavellian. I doubt this would satisfy either of my 
initial critics. I know my reliance on Machiavelli has become 
obsessive. In only hope it will provide a fruitful point of 
departure, although I fear it exposes me to an awesome standard of 
comparison (6).
I. "...THERE IS NOTHING MORE DIFFICULT TO EXECUTE, NOR MORE 
DUBIOUS OF SUCCESS,. NOR MORE DANGEROUS TO ADMINISTER THAN TO 
INTRODUCE A NEW SYSTEM OF THINGS: FOR HE WHO INTRODUCES IT HAS ALL 
THOSE WHO PROFIT FROM THE OLD SYSTEM AS HIS ENEMIES AND HE HAS 
ONLY LUKEWARM ALLIES IN ALL THOSE WHO MIGHT PROFIT FROM THE NEW 
SYSTEM" (PRINCE, VI. 94.)
Regime transformation —  in whatever direction — involves a 
considerable risk to those promoting it and a substantial, if 




























































































conspiracies ... attempted but very few reach their desired goal",
(Prince VI, 94), but even once successful in seizing power, very 
few conspirators, Machiavelli suggests, will manage to institute 
"a new system of things". Of all the acts of political courage 
and knavery, therefore, efforts aimed at altering the basic 
structure of authority and not just the occupants of office, at
changing the very calculus of public choice and not just the
content of policy, at affecting the established distribution of 
power resources and not just the pattern of political benefits —
in other words, attacks on the persistence of a given regime —
are likely to be among the most rationally calculated and 
deliberately willful. However passionate and spontaneous the 
behavior of rebels may appear and even become in the course of a 
mobilized, violent seizure of power or other form of regime 
change, under that behavior lies a calculus of dissent —  a 
weighing of costs and benefits to be probabilistically gained from 
different investments in political action and vdifferent resultant 
configurations of authority (7). Political action of this nature 
and import cannot be explained exclusively in terms of either 
unconscious responses to functional imperatives or instinctual 
reactions to cultural norms —  no matter how much "necessity", as 
Machiavelli liked to call it, establishes the conditions of choice 
or "love" determines what actors would prefer to see happen. It is 
the calculus of dissent with respect to regime type that we will 




























































































So uncertain, however, is the calculus and so momentous may 
be the consequences for any given individual that most will prefer
not to make it. This rational indifference to regime questions,
coupled with the quasi-instinctual nature of political behavior
when the stakes are low and the actions are repetitive,
constitutes the strongest barrier to possible regime
transformation. If, indeed, "a man who is used to acting in one 
way never changes" (Discourses, III, 9, 382), and if, by changing, 
he would incur a high risk of political failure (not to mention 
personal injury), why would regime forms change at all? Why would 
they not merely perpetuate themselves indefinitely through 
marginal adjustments in policy and occasional circulations in 
elites?
This question of why regime transformation occurs I will 
address later. What is of concern here is the implication that the 
demise of one form and the possible rise of another form of 
political domination is a relatively rare event, especially when 
compared to most instances of political behavior which have been 
"scientifically" observed and analyzed. There can be no question 
of using effectively the powers of statistical inference or even 
empirical induction based on a large number of observations. Each 
case will be too uniquely specified in time, space and content, 
not to mention the fact that, through diffusion and 
exemplification, past cases will contaminate those occurring in 



























































































becoming a "one to one" mapping of reality with as many 
explanations as cases, as many variables as events (8).
We must, therefore, proceed "in as general a manner as the 
subject matter will allow", identify a set of generic outcomes, 
processes, motives and actors and seek to expose the politico- 
logic of their interrelation, knowing full well that the types, 
specifications, and Gestalten may not fit well with any specific 
case whose past behavior one is attempting to explain or whose 
future outcome one is attempting to predict. In this vein, I 
propose to work backward —  from a typology of how authoritarian 
regimes are overthrown, to why this might happen, to who might be 
involved and, finally, to what might be the consequences of such a




























































































II. AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES COMMONLY TRANSFORM THEMSELVES OR ARE 
TRANSFORMED IN ONE OF FOUR WAYS DEPENDING ON WHO LEADS THE 
STRUGGLE AND WHETHER ACTUAL VIOLENCE IS USED. (PCS)
No regime —  authoritarian or other —  collapses or is 
overthrown unless it and its supporters are threatened by
violence. No matter how poor the performance, how narrow the 
circle of beneficiaries or how weak the moral justification for 
ruling, those in power will persist in their practices and
procedures (but not necessarily in their policies) until
sufficiently and plausibly threatened by physical harm or forceful 
loss of resources (9). When compelled to act, they may do so out 
of imperative necessity or anticipated reaction.
For rulers do not always wait to act until forced to do so on 
the terrain and at the moment of their opponents' choosing.
Political actors are capable of projecting the consequences of 
their actions and predicting those of others. With the aid of 
"theory" (usually bashed on examples from cases elsewhere judged to 
have been analogous in nature), they may anticipate future 
outcomes and act so as to forestall unwanted outcomes. As
Machiavelli put it, "in order not to lose everything, (actors
* were) forced to concede to (others) their own share" (Prince, II,
181). Therefore, regimes may change in nature (and not just in 
material benefits or symbolic trappings) without an actual 
mobilization of their opponents and/or without the actual use of 




























































































background. In other words, power may be given over 
(Machtuebergabe) and not just seized (Machtergreifung).
Where actors in power calculate that the benefits to 
remaining in power clearly exceed the costs (direct and indirect) 
of repressing their opponents, they will resist to threat of 
violence with actual violence. In fact in such circumstances they 
have an incentive to act pre-emptively and even to provoke 
violence by their opponents —  thereby, achieving what Machiavelli 
constantly strives for, i.e. "an economy of violence".
Where actors in power miscalculate their own resources and/or 
those of their threatening opponents, or where they perceive no 
option of exiting from the situation with crucial resources 
intact, they will also act violently, but without efficiency. 
Quite the contrary, such miscalculated and desperate violence 
becomes counterproductive: "the more cruelty (they) employ, the 
weaker (their regime) becomes" when rulers have the general 
population as their enemy (Discourses I, 16, 220). Also 
Machiavelli sagely warns that once regime proponents and opponents 
are forced to mobilize themselves and actually to confront each 
other with insults, insolence and violence both the stakes in the 
conflict and the expectations lodged in its outcome rise 
dangerously : "When (false) hope enters men's breasts, it causes 
them to go beyond their work and, in most cases, to lose the 
opportunity of possessing a certain good by hoping to obtain a 




























































































Regimes may also change from a sequential combination of 
reactions to violent mobilization and peaceful transformation. 
Actors who have been successful in the past at meeting the threat 
of violence with the use of violence against their opponents may
9
choose to react to the prospect of renewed violence by handing 
<- over power (or a portion of it) because their former actions have
temporarily eliminated their most dangerous opponents or because 
they are beginning to suffer the weakness brought on by their past 
cruelties. In this case, regime transformations coincide not with 
the high point of violent mobilization, but with its aftermath —  
even with periods of considerable quiescence.
The presence of a threat of violence against a given 
authoritarian regime (and not just against one or more of its 
policies) differentially affects the political necessity and 
calculation of two (not always initially clearly distinguishable) 
groups: (1) those who have benefitted from and/or been included in 
the regime; and (2) those who have suffered or been excluded from 
it. As we shall see infra, a great deal hinges on whether this 
differential impact produces two exclusive and polarized 
reactions, or whether it has a centripetal influence through its
%
differential effect within the two "camps" of supporters and 
' opponents.
Among regime opponents, those who have suffered direct 
deprivations (antagonists, let us call them) will be most likely 




























































































but they will probably lack the necessary resources for effective 
collective action unless they are assisted by some external 
"prince", e.g. exiles or members of transnational political 
movements. Those who have been politically excluded by 
authoritarian rulers, but have not suffered specific deprivations 
(subjects in my terminology) may possess the aggregate resources 
necessary; however, their sheer numbers, dispersion and less 
intense motivation normally mitigate against collective action on 
their part.
Among regime supporters those included with it, benefitting 
from it and responsible for it (protagonists) are most likely to 
respond violently in its defense, so much so that they may resort 
to violence even against fellow benefactors who show a willingness 
to compromise with real or emergent threats.
Finally, actors who benefit from the authoritarian regime, 
but are not directly dependent on it or responsible for its 
policies (supporters) . present a real but ambiguous threat to its 
persistence. They are likely to possess significant (positive and 
negative) resources, to be small enough in number, concentrated in 
location, and astute enough in calculation to act collectively out 
of choice and not necessity —  if sufficiently assured about 
retaining already acquired resources and future benefits under 
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Those politico-logical distinctions can be juxtaposed to each 
other to produce a matrix with four modal types or strategies for 
the demise of authoritarian rule.
11.1. in a seizure of power, some segment or faction of those who 
have participated and benefitted from authoritarian rule 
react with concerted violence, normally by coup d'Etat, to 
eject, even to eliminate physically, the present occupants 
from executive office. They are most likely to attempt to 
institute a purified, more repressive and exclusive, type of 
regime, although their sheer vulnerability may lead them to 
broaden their basis of support by appealing to some subjects 
of the previous regime.
11.2. In a transfer of power, the principal actors guiding regime 
transformation consist of ex-beneficiaries who were not 
directly compromised by or deeply involved with regime 
policies and who acquire their reins of power and office 
without a substantial mobilization for violence on their 
part.
II.3 In a surrender of power, previous authoritarian rulers, 
faced with a greater credible threat from antagonists and/or 
more aggressive protagonists, prudentially agree to withdraw 
from formal positions of authority in favor of a set of 




























































































themselves capable of mobilized violence. A special case of 
this type consists of situations in which the transformation
occurs in the context of impending or actual defeat in war
) 'and may be presided over by an occupying foreign power.
II.4. In an overthrow of power, the previous authoritarian rulers 
resist violently, but unsuccessfully, and are forceably 
ousted by the mobilized efforts of their formerly conformist 
subjects and victimized antagonists. Here, they lose not 
only formal control over the offices of public authority and 
the transition process, but also their informal political 
resources —  up to and including both property and life.
*  *  *
Needless to say, any concrete historical instance of the 
calculus of dissent, which results in the downfall of a given 
authoritarian regime may involve some combination of several or 
even all of these modal types. One could argue that "pure 
instances" are not only rare, but likely to fail. For example, 
successful seizures of power usually depend on at least the 
spectre of an impending overthrow by radical antagonists. The 
personal sacrifice and mass mobilization involved in an overthrow 
are unlikely to prevail where either a preemptive transfer or a 




























































































attractive resolution to the regime crisis —  unless such 
temptations are ruled out by hard-time protagonists.
A recent volume on the breakdown of democracies argues 
(implicitly) that such strategies should be regarded not as 
simultaneously, but as sequentially available modes for solving 
the problem of regime transformation (10). Juan Linz in his 
introductory essay argues that the rise of authoritarian regimes 
from previously democratic ones involved either an inadvertent 
overthrow through civil war or, more often, a surrender of power, 
but this eventual outcome followed upon a prior seizure of power 
by a narrowly-based group within the previous democratic regime. 
Such prior transformations within the factional structure of power 
also seem characteristic of the demise of authoritarian rule.
For Machiavelli, mobilized violence was a virtual necessity 
(he cites with approval Juvenal's maxim that "few tyrants die a 
bloodless death" —  Discourses III, 6, 360). He repeatedly poured 
scorn on those who . sought a negotiated, middle-of-the-road 
compromise to such a vital issue. Certainly the literature on 
regime transformation, scanty as it is, emphasizes the role of 
conspiratorial seizure and/or mass overthrow. Perhaps it is my 
normative bias against violence or my empirical conviction that 
viable democracies have emerged more often historically as 
"second-best" compromises between stalemated political forces 
incapable of imposing their preferred mode of governance by regime 




























































































to strategies of transfer and surrender in which previous regime 
beneficiaries and passive opponents —  unable and unwilling to
eject forceably authoritarian rulers from power —  are incapable
)
of ruling without each other's resources of power and legitimacy. 
Hence, they reach a compromise and agree to establish some form of 
democracy which excludes only the extremes of die-hard
protagonists and revanchiste antagonists of the defunct regime. 
The central property usually stressed in the context of a 
declining regime is vulnerability to overthrow or seizure by 
centrifugal extremists. I will be looking for dispensability 
leading to the transfer or surrender of power to centripetal 
moderates. We are by no means assured of finding the latter, but
we have reason to suspect that such an outcome may provide a 
better and more viable basis for political democracy.
III. (BECAUSE MEN'S) (12) DESIRE IS ALWAYS GREATER THAN THEIR 
POWER OF ACQUISITION, DISCONTENT WITH WHAT THEY POSSESS AND 
LACK OF SATISFACTION (WITH HOW THEY OBTAINED IT) ARE THE 
RESULT (13). FROM THIS ARISE THE VARIATIONS IN THEIR 
FORTUNES, FOR SINCE SOME DESIRE TO POSSESS MORE AND OTHERS 
FEAR TO LOSE WHAT THEY HAVE ACQUIRED, (POLITICAL ENMITIES 
WILL CONSTANTLY ARISE AND LEAD TO THE RUIN OF ONE REGIME AND 
THE EXHALTATION OF ANOTHER - PCS) Discourses, I, 37, 247.
Given that "human affairs are always in motion, either rising 




























































































things of this world have a limit to their existence" (Discourses,
111,1, 351), perhaps one should wonder, not why authoritarian 
regimes collapse or are transformed, but why any form of 
patterned, consensual domination can long endure. Presumably, 
prudence in the face of the high risks involved in changing the 
existing order, combined with a general inability to learn new 
ways of doing things (14), prevent political life from becoming 
completely chaotic in form and random in behavior.
Moreover, whatever the type of regime, its internal order 
requires some degree of self-limitation and self-abnegation if it 
is to survive: "Just as the states of princes have endured for a 
long time so too have the states of republics; both have needed to 
be regulated by laws, for a prince who is able to do what he 
wishes is mad, and a people that can do what it wishes is unwise" 
(Discourses, I, 58, 285). This "legality" is far from the element 
of "legitimacy" stressed by so many Neo-Weberian students of 
regime persistence in that it refers to self-regulated, prudential 
behavior by those in. power, not to the belief by those out of 
power that their rulers are rightfully entitled to their positions 
of domination.
Purely arbitrary, unself-restrained, i.e. "tyrannical", forms 
of authoritarian rule are intrinsically unstable because they 
encourage "madness" among their leaders and cannot inculcate 
predictable and prudential ways of acting in their subjects —  not 




























































































illegitimate in the eyes of the citizenry. Hence, "sultanistic", 
or highly personalistic, authoritarian regimes (15) face rather 
different problems and must rely on rather different resources 
(especially physical coercion and fear) to survive. The mode of 
their demise, the motivation and identity of their opponents and 
the longer-term consequences of their replacement are 
correspondingly likely to be different from those of their more 
established, impersonal, predictable, "bureaucratic-authoritarian" 
relatives.
III.l. "Since human affairs are constantly changing and never 
remain fixed, it is necessary that they rise or fall and many 
things you are not compelled to do by reason, you are impelled to 
do by necessity" (Prince, VI, 192). Authoritarian regimes fall 
(or, better, diminish in their viability) from two intersecting 
and overlapping sets of motives. By necessity, people may have to 
act (be compelled to act) out of fear of losing what they have 
already acquired or out of need for acquiring what they feel they 
must have. By reaspn, people may choose to act (be impelled to 
act) out of calculation of what may happen in the future, unless 
changes intervene, or out of admiration for what they regard as a 
better, more just, socio-political order. Machiavelli, while 
acknowledging the force of reasonable anticipation and admiration, 
was skeptical about the constancy of its effect and the 
predictability of its outcome: "men always turn out badly for you 
unless some necessity makes them good" (Prince, XXIII, 137); "men




























































































freedom to choose and can do as they please, everything 
immediately becomes confused and disorderly" (Discourses, I, 3, 
182). Love for a particularly just leader or admiration for good 
moral principles, "since men are a sorry lot is broken on every 
occasion in which their own self-interest is concerned; but fear 
is held together by a dread of punishment which will never abandon 
you" (Prince, XVII, 131). If one includes in the notion of 
necessary fear, not just the possibility of punishing acts by 
those in power, but also the more "capitalistic" response of 
depriving actions by those in control of the economy, then one 
might agree with Machiavelli that satisfaction of immediate self- 
interest provides a more prominent and predictable motive for 
opposing or supporting a given regime than reasonable (but more 
remote) calculation and/or reasonable (but possibly fickle) 
admiration (16).
Nevertheless, the subsequent development of instruments of 
rational calculation in political life (e.g. professional staffs, 
statistical data analysis and inference, planning techniques, 
social science theory, etc.) and the growing role of international 
standards of admirable behavior in political life (e.g. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Charter, innumerable 
constitutional prologues, international pressure groups, etc.) 
have enhanced the importance of choice with respect to regime 
type. Levels of living above mere subsistence and more humane 
punishments for violations of authority have perhaps diminished 




























































































political action. Opponents and renegade supporters of 
authoritarian rule may feel sufficiently freed from those narrow 
and predictable constraints to indulge in their preference for a 
more legitimate and just type of regime, or to take a calculated 
risk on the longer-term benefits to be gleaned from a more 
rational and better structured form of governance —  even when not 
enticed to do so by the opportunity for immediate benefits or 
forced to do so by the prospect of unbearable costs.
For these motivational categories of necessity and choice, we 
can deduce four modal answers to the question of why a given 
authoritarian regime may be seized or overthrown, forced to 
transfer or surrender power:
III.l. Success: If modern authoritarian regimes are the 
contemporary functional equivalents of classic dictatorship, their 
demise would be easy to understand, if still difficult to predict. 
Machiavelli defined the dictator as "(one) created for a 
circumscribed period, of time, and only in order to deal with the 
problem for which he was chosen. His authority encompassed the 
power to decide for himself the way in which to deal with this 
urgent danger, to do everything without consultation, and to 
punish anyone without appeal, but he could do nothing which would 
alter the form of government ..." (Prince, XXXIV, 244). Once the 
authoritarian rulers had satisfied the necessities of those who 
placed them in power (including their own), the "unfortunate 




























































































return to the form of government it had known previously. The 
rulers, finding that "those who were at first trusted" had become 
increasingly hostile to the ruler's perpetration in power and 
being unable to obtain "more loyalty and more utility in those men 
who, at the beginning of their rule, were considered suspect" 
(Prince, XX, 148) would (or better, should) prudentially step 
aside. Most contemporary "liberal" justifications for 
authoritarian rule seem to be based on such a functionalist, 
problem-solving "logic" of the relation between regime type and 
system imperatives. These apologists tend to discount or ignore 
the possibility that dictators will succeed in creating or 
inventing new "necessities" in order to retain the support of 
their initial promoters, or that they will resolve the problems 
that brought them to power so slowly or in a manner that would 
irreversibly alter the pre-existing from of government, making 
return to it virtually impossible. In Machiavelli's terms, there 
is an ever-present danger that they will "corrupt the society".
III.2. Failure: If the authoritarian regime persistently and 
manifestly fails to resolve the problems which occasioned its rise 
(or which were occasioned by its rise), its benefactors and 
expectant beneficiaries will come to fear it and regard its 
transformation as necessary. Its initial enemies and subsequent 
victims will, consequently, be reinforced in their opposition. An 
extreme instance of regime failure —  indeed, the most common and 
probable cause of the demise of such regimes —  has been defeat in 




























































































more threatened by "internal emergencies" because they tolerate 
the expression of dissent in reaction to failures not even of 
their own making (Prince, XXXIII, 241). By inverted reasoning, 
unsuccessful principalities/authoritarian regimes may be more 
vulnerable to "external emergencies", if only because they 
themselves provoke failure by engaging in more adventurous and 
aggressive foreign policies.
In the simplest, but least likely, of circumstances the 
failure of authoritarian rule is so complete and convincing that 
it provokes what Machiavelli called "universal hatred" uniting 
both the common people and the notables against it. Only defeat in
war seems capable of bringing about such a "catastrophic"
consensus. More likely is the situation in which a broad, but
diffuse, assessment of failure pervades "the general populace"
while a small, privileged set of supporters continues to judge the 
regime successful (and yet still indispensible). Such relative 
failures in authoritarian governance may persist for some time -- 
either because the .extent of malperformance has not yet reached 
"the realm of necessity" where vital interests are threatened, or 
because the sheer diffuseness of its impact encourages opponents 
to "free ride", hoping that someone else will take the risks and 
pay the costs of seizing or overthrowing the regime.
In discussing "the causes of conspiracy against Princes"
(Discourses III, 6, 358), Machiavelli downplays the importance of




























































































elsewhere only "in times of adversity", when the prince will be 
unable to call upon "the friendship of the common people" to
overcome a more focused challenge to his authority and office 
(Prince, IX, 109). The specific type of failure which is most 
likely to provoke these challenges lies in "offenses against 
individuals" —  acts of deprivation, interpreted as unjust or 
arbitrary, against specifically designated persons (or, by 
extension, small groups) who, as a consequence, come to fear for 
their survival. Since the certain fact of losing what one has 
already acquired (or the eminent prospect of such a loss) is a 
stronger and more predictable basis for action than the uncertain 
opportunity for obtaining what one does not yet have (or has lost 
some time ago), and since those who lose some property, privilege 
or honor are likely still to have more disposable political 
resources at hand than those who have never had them (or long 
since been deprived of them), it is the failures of authoritarian 
rulers which affect discrete groups or individuals among their own 
supporters and past beneficiaries that are most conducive to 
"causing a conspiracy" against perpetuation in power. The 
implication is that if a failed regime can manage to distribute 
its deprivations in a diffuse and proportional manner —  not only 
across the population, but among its own supporters —  it can 
survive periods of very poor performance, even if it is not 
admired or loved on other grounds.
Most authoritarian regimes are neither marked successes nor 




























































































emergence of new problems in addition to those which brought them 
into existence (some of their own creation; some thrust upon 
them), sustains them in power much longer than would be expected 
if regime change were a mere instrumental-functionalist response 
to what liberals call "the problems of modernization" and Marxists 
call "the imperative contradictions of delayed-dependent 
capitalist development". No doubt, instances can be found of 
"Salvationist" dictatorships which withdraw after successfully 
managing a particular crisis, and of "catastrophic" autocracies 
which collapse from threats to the survival of the general 
populace and strategic supporters, but most contemporary 
transformations of authoritarian regimes are not motivated 
strictly by necessity. They involve complex elements of choice —  
of willful political action based on reasonable anticipation and 
admiration.
III.3. Decay (18): Authoritarian rulers "used to acting in one way 
never change; (they) must come to ruin when the times, in 
changing, no longer ai;e in harmony with (their) ways" (Discourses, 
III, 9, 382). Whatever the causes-cum-motives of their accession 
to power, whatever their success or failure in meeting these 
causes, those who rule for any length of time will have to adjust 
to a shifting panoply of new circumstances; some of which 
(Machiavelli reckoned about one half) are occasioned by 
unforeseeable and unavoidable events of fortune; others of which 
are the unintentional product of past actions: "one can never 




























































































(Discourses, I, 6, 190), or the unavoidable consequence of faulty 
calculation: "shortsightedness in human nature will begin a policy 
that seems good but does not notice the poison that is 
underneath." (Prince, XXX, 123).
All regimes, therefore, must be periodically revived and 
restructured. Machiavelli thought that ten years was a maximum 
interval "because after that amount of time has elapsed men begin 
to change their habits and to break the laws ... if nothing arises 
that recalls the penalty to their minds and renews the fear in 
their hearts" (Discourses, III, 1, 353). Princes or authoritarian 
rulers are less capable of such acts of re-establishment of 
authority and revision of policies because by their nature they 
must draw on a narrower variety of experience than democracies 
(Discourses, III, 9, 382), and because their internal procedures 
will restrict (through strict rules of cooptation) or prohibit 
(through lifetime perpetuation) the succession to higher office of 
those capable of understanding and responding to new challenges 
and issues in novel ways. Whether by rotation of parties in-and- 
out of power or by realignment of parliamentary alliances in 
response to shifts in electoral fortune, democratic regimes 
possess a functional substitute for overcoming the fixity of 
individual human natures and the sclerosis induced in institutions 
by previously successful policies (19). The inability of a given 
authoritarian regime to use predictably the dilemma of succession 
as an opportunity to re-establish the foundations of public 




























































































strategically disruptive behavior on the part of its supporters as 
well as its opponents. Moreover, it orients this behavior toward 
changes in the nature of the regime itself and not just 
modifications in its policies. Even actors freed from the 
compulsion of sheer necessity, benefitting from the regime itself 
and not fearful of losing what they have, may begin to calculate 
that their best, longer-term, interest lies with another prince 
or, alternatively, in a republic "ready to turn itself according 
to the way the winds of fortune and the changeability of affairs 
require*. (Prince, XVIII, 135).
This strategic "indifference" to the form of political 
domination on the part of those near to power, coupled with the 
growing expectation that those in office will prove incapable of 
coping with the "crooked and unknown roads" of fortune or with the 
perverse and unexpected outcomes of previous policies, is 
particularly subversive of the viability of authoritarian regimes. 
Not only is this shift in support difficult to spot beforehand, it 
is difficult to attribute to any specific, immediately present, 
material factor and, hence, virtually impossible to buy off in any 
reliable fashion. Efforts to react by "recalling penalties and 
renewing fears" are only likely to precipitate action out of 
necessity. What is worse, those most inclined to react to decay 
have important resources to deny the regime and/or to supply its 
opponents. Authoritarian regimes in such a dilemma are neither 
clear functional successes nor failures according to their stated 




























































































own destruction" - all right, but these have come up, not in the 
cultivated plots of fearful necessity, but in the fallow soil of 
anticipated reaction.
III.4. Delegitimation; Of all the motives Machiavelli considered 
might lead citizens to change rulers, the least likely and 
reliable he thought was "love" —  either the loss of it on the 
part of those in power or the "desire to free one's city" on the 
part of those excluded by princely power. Doses of fear, 
judiciously and economically applied, would suffice —  he thought 
—  to overcome such momentary losses of popularity and to disperse 
such higher moral purpose. Contemporary students of politics 
attribute a good deal more significance to the normative basis for 
political action, i.e., to the need for legitimate grounds of 
political obligation and consent in order for regimes to persist. 
Presumably, this is a joint product of the diffusion and 
inculcation of standards of proper behavior within cultural areas 
and of changes in the content of state actions which demand 
greater voluntary compliance on the part of citizens if they are 
to be efficiently and effectively implemented. Fear of sanctions 
alone is no longer sufficient to induce people to serve (or to 
prevent them from disserving) the interests of the state. New and 
more complex linkages between a mobilized, literate, popular 
community and an expanded providential state make it more 
imperative that rulers be loved and respected —  even when they 




























































































competition and representative government to the wishes and whims 
of the public.
Demonstrating that delegitimation (or illegitimacy) is a 
plausible motive for the demise of any given authoritarian regime 
(or of such regimes in general) may be logically, as well as 
empirically, more difficult than attributing its downfall to 
dissatisfaction of immediate needs, threat to acquired goods or 
frustration of eventual opportunities.
First, actors must be shown not only to possess values 
antithetic to authoritarian rule with sufficient conviction and 
intensity (20), but these preferences about the form of political 
domination must be proven independent of the content of policies 
expected from a regime change. Citizens should demonstrably value 
how politics is conducted separately from who benefits from 
political action. If they feel it is illegitimate, regardless of 
whether it is perceived as a success or a failure, regardless of 
whether it seems capable of coping’or not with emergent issues, 
the regime will be opposed —  even when its demise may leave the 
opponent in a less favorable, objective circumstance. If not, if 
their ethical objections are hedged, such "normatively" phrased 
motives for opposition can safely be reduced to the more mundane 
(and predictable) category of self-regarding necessity or to the 
more ethereal (but reliable) category of calculated anticipation. 




























































































place and through which actors with divergent needs and 
calculations can ally for a convergent, if fleeting, purpose.
Second, the existing regime must be shown to "need" 
legitimation for its survival. The values must not only clearly 
identify existing authorities as unworthy of respect and voluntary 
compliance —  something these actors may make difficult by 
disguising themselves behind democratic façades or by themselves 
promising eventual conformity to democratic practices —  but they 
must also be linked to depriving authorities of key strategic 
resources acquired for the perpetuation of governance. If the 
regime can get the compliance it needs by merely "recalling the 
penalty" to the mind of its subjects and "renewing the fear" in 
the hearts of its citizenry without seriously diverting scarce 
resources or upsetting future calculations, then no matter how 
deeply enculcated and sharply focused they are, dissenting values 
about the form of domination may be of little consequence.
One serious problem affecting the legitimacy of regimes which 
persist for some time in power is the inherent decay involved in 
the transmission of political values across generations. Just as 
respect for authority and identity with party may increase at 
compounding rates once a new regime is founded, so has a secular 
process of decline and disillusionment set in "once the generation 




























































































Inversely, the protractedness with which some authoritarian 
regimes persist —  despite intergenerational decay in normative 
support —  suggests another problem. Machiavelli observes that, 
because some polities had long suffered princely rule, their 
societies had become so corrupted that no manner of republican 
self-government could be expected to take hold. If such a regime 
could isolate its citizenry from the contrary influences of a 
democratic Zeitgeist either by censoring its sources of 
information or by convincing it of its peculiar "political 
culture", and if it could inculcate such a respect for hierarchy 
of office and privilege and inequality of access and acquisition 
(21), it could confine questions of legitimacy to the holders of 
specific positions without jeopardizing the survival of the regime 
itself.
★ * *
Our discussion of why the demise of a given authoritarian 
regime might occur has been expressed in quite generic abstract 
terms. Success, Failure, Decay, and Delegitimation are categories 
obviously capable of encompassing a vast variety of much more 
specific interests, fears, 'projections and aspirations. It is 
precisely because contemporary instances of efforts to remove and 
to defend entrenched authoritarian rulers are likely to involve a 




























































































speculations at a general level. Once analysts have obtained 
enough descriptive material and identified groups of analogous 
experiences, then they can pass to more discriminating statements 
about the kinds of interests affected by regime success, the types 
of fear generated by failure, the ranger of anticipated reactions 
inspired by decay and the sorts of normative aspirations which 
trigger delegitimation. At present, there are only fragmentary, 
anecdotal illustrations of why classes, sectors, statuses, 
ethnies, regions, generations, institutions or even individuals 
came to oppose, became indifferent to, or stayed to support given 
authoritarian regimes under specific (often quite unique) 
circumstances.
There is also more than a hint, perhaps a persistent
suspicion, that few instances of the demise of authoritarian
regimes correspond exclusively and exhaustively to a single
category of the already quite simplified motivational set I have 
sketched out above. Such regimes are often simultaneously 
perceived as successful, and, therefore, dispensible in the eyes of 
their initial proponents; failed and, therefore, obstructive to 
the realization of the interests of some of their frustrated 
supporters and almost all of their opponents; decadent and, 
therefore, probably unfavorable to the future opportunities of 
many of their present supporters; and illegitimate and, therefore, 
offensive to the values of various publics. If consensus is even 
rarer at the demise of a regime that at its founding, what may be 




























































































indifference and opposition. That mix of "whys" may be crucial 
both for identifying the "whos" responsible for regime seizure, 
overthrow, transfer or surrender, and for specifying "what 
consequences" such as transformation might eventually have for the 
viability of any ensuing democratic regime.
IV. BECAUSE MEN ARE CAPABLE OF COLLIDING AND COALIGNING WITH EACH 
OTHER FOR A WIDE RANGE OF PURPOSES AND ISSUES AND BECAUSE THEY 
EXHIBIT DIFFERING PROPENSITIES FOR TAKING RISKS AND FOR 
DISCOUNTING TIME, NO SINGLE GROUP OF THEM OR ALLIANCE OF 
GROUPS WILL PREDICTABLY AND RELIABLY CAUSE THE DEMISE OF 
AUTHORITARIAN RULE. AT SOME POINT IN TIME, IN SOME CONTEXT OF 
ACTION, ANY GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL MAY SUPPORT, TOLERATE OR 
OPPOSE THE PERSISTENCE OF AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME. (PCS)
Here I part company rather dramatically with my illustrious 
Florentine predecessor. As he saw it, the polities of his time 
were divided into two mutually exclusive social groups: the 
"nobles" and the "people", each composed of different persons and 
interests, each with clear and incompatible regime preferences. 
Since the former wished only "to be free to command" and the 
latter "to be free from command", the identity of those supporting 
princely rule and those supporting republican rule was easy to 
establish within the social structure and relatively fixed across 
time. This tradition of associating dichotomously defined groups 




























































































(Lord-Peasant, Bourgeois-Proletarian, Master-Slave, Creditor- 
Debtor, Producer-Consumer, Center-Periphery and so forth) without, 
however, producing a convincing explanation or description of who 
provokes either the rise or the demise of authoritarian rule. Some 
of those who "should" have resisted oppression, exploitation, 
enslavement, dependency, etc. by struggling for "freedom from 
command" have turned up on the wrong side of the barricades (or, 
more often, chosen to remain indifferent until others had taken 
the risk and paid the cost of a "beneficial" regime change). 
Inversely, the ranks of those assaulting authoritarian regimes 
have often been swelled (if not lead) by those who had formerly 
been "free to command". More often than not, regime preference and 
tolerance have divided categories of actors and rarely brought 
together groups of economic or social homogeneity. One could go so 
far as to claim that part of the process undermining regime 
viability involves the fragmentation of previously coherent 
economic and social interests and their recombination into 
unprecedented alliances oriented around alternative strategies for 
regime defense and demise. Hence, even if one could analytically 
identify and empirically isolate two warring coalitions (22): one 
of privileged, defensive, commanding "nobles" and another of 
aspiring, aggressive, freedom-loving "plebes", it is by no means 
clear that the two camps would be composed of distinctive and 
mutually exclusive economic classes, social statuses, geographic 
locuses, productive sectors or institutional situses —  not even 





























































































Given this social heterogeneity in the contemporary basis of 
both support for and opposition to authoritarian rule, the best 
one can expect is to specify the generically relevant features of 
actors with respect to such regimes —  and then, in efforts aimed 
at explaining distinctive historical instances of their 
transformation, to fill in these categories with the class, 
sectoral, locational and generational units specifically 
appropriate to the case and time period at hand.
The most obvious and elementary categorization of positional 
actors with respect to existing regimes involves whether they are 
in or out of power. Those "in power" can be further subdivided, as 
we have argued above, into those directly involved in and 
responsible for the acts of the regime (protagonists), i.e, those 
whose office or status is primarily dependent upon the regime, and 
those whose support is courted, whose opinions are solicited and 
whose actions are encouraged and subsidized by the regime, but 
whose position and property are independent of it (supporters). 
Actors "out of power" *can also be usefully dichotomised into those 
who are ignored, acted upon or controlled by the regime but whose 
existence is tolerated proved they do not act collectively to 
thwart its purposes or challenge its existence (subjects), and 
those who are deliberately deprived or persecuted by it 
(antagonists). The latter two categories constitute the great bulk 
of the population under authoritarian rule, except for "populist" 
varieties which seek to fuse the passive categories of supporter 




























































































and benign neglect may be sufficient to contain most persons 
within the realm of passive obedience and to isolate successfully 
most potential antagonists.. These most intransigeant opponents, in 
turn, are likely to be subdivided into those driven into exile by 
persecution (23) and those who continue to reside precariously 
without the country.
The second generic factor of differentiation is strategic in 
nature and is furnished by Machiavelli. He suggested that actors 
responded to political choice with one of two dispositions: (1) 
they could seek to minimize losses and protect what they had 
already acquired; or (2) they could be driven by the desire to 
expand their resources and benefits further, thereby, exhibiting a 
much greater propensity for taking risks in the prospect of 
maximizing gains.
(PLACE FIGURE II HERE)
Figure II displays these two dimensions of political 
position/disposition in a matrix which generates six generic types 
of actors —  each with a presumed different propensity for acting 
with respect to the authoritarian regime in power. The examples of 
social, political and economic groups at the bottom of each cell 
are merely illustrative since, as I noted above, the mix of those 
supporting or opposing authoritarian rule varies considerably from 
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IV.1. In one of his most apposite passages, Machiavelli argues 
rather counter-intuitively that defensive or conservative actors 
may be more dangerous to regime persistence than acquisitive or 
aggressive ones for "in most cases
... disturbances are caused by those who 
possess for the fear of losing generates 
in them the same desires that those who 
desire to acquire possess 
Furthermore, those who possess more can 
with greater force and speed effect 
changes. And what is more serious, their 
unchecked and ambitious behavior kindles 
the desire for possession in the minds 
of those who do not possess. (Discourses 
I, 5, 187-8).
Actors oriented toward acquiring resources, positions and 
benefices they do not presently have are easier to deal with. 
Their chosen goals are less certain and, perhaps, less tangible 
(honor, freedom and future property instead of security, command 
and present property). Their available resources are less 
substantial and, perhaps, less concentrated. Their disturbances 
are less likely to becdme contagious. Most important, defensively 
motivated actions against regime persistence can be more difficult 
to predict and recognize than acquisitive ones since they may 
represent rapid reversals of position and/or since they may come 
disguised as supportive in intent.
IV.2. Machiavelli also warns authoritarian rulers-cum-princes that
they can rarely rule by themselves, but must rule through or with 




























































































power than those subjected to it or far removed from it. As with 
the defensive actors, protagonists and supporters typically have 
more opportunity and resources to act. The distribution of offices 
and favors to those in power or supportive of it tends to create 
new and further obligations; gratitude for benefits received is 
quickly forgotten or discounted in favor of expanded expectations. 
(Prince, x, 112) (24). "All conspiracies have been formed by those 
closest to the prince" —  because those farther removed are too 
weak individually and too numerous collectively to organize a 
successful challenge. Subjects and antagonists, he suggested, 
"When they are tired of a prince, they turn to cursing him and 
wait for others who have greater power than they possess to avenge 
them." Although Machiavelli might marvel at the disruptive power 
and dedicated effort of small groups of intense antagonists in 
modern, interdependent, ideologically mobilized and media 
conscious polities, he probably would conclude, as he did in the 
early 1500s, that such quixotic attempts deserved to be praised 
for their intentions, but not for their prudence or intelligence.
IV.3. Just as modern princes can rarely rule alone, modern 
conspirators can rarely activate their calculus of dissent without 
allies. Heroic, individualistic action, say tyrannicide by lone 
assassin or small band, may still suffice against highly 
personalistic dictators (although replacement by family or friend 
without regime change is the usual outcome), but the removal of 
established, bureaucratized and impersonal, authoritarian rulers 




























































































protracted period of time. It may be possible to locate after the 
event, even to predict before its occurrence, which category of 
actor will attempt to build a dissenting coalition. However, the 
success of the effort will depend on its choice of allies which 
will, in turn, vary according to whether the strategy chosen aims 
at seizure, overthrow, transfer to surrender of power and whether 
the motivational incentives of success, failure, decay or 
delegitimation are sufficiently and appropriately distributed 
across the conspiratorial alliance. The fact that different types 
of actors are likely to prefer different strategies and possess 
different motives for regime transformation may prevent the demise 
of even the most unsuccessful, decadent and delegitimated of 
authoritarian regimes for some time. This may especially be the 
case if, to the inevitable difficulties of putting together a 
heterogeneous coalition of dissent, one adds the deliberate 
tactics of the regime itself at differential repressions and 
selective concession intended to divide et impera its opponents in 
general and the possible efforts of its agents provocateurs aimed 
at discrediting specific groups and actions.
IV.3. One specific institutional actor occupies a unique position 
within the generic categories I have identified, simply because 
under normal circumstances, it alone possesses sufficient 
resources which, if applied concertedly, could countermand, if not 
suppress outright, all threats to regime persistence. Machiavelli 
observes that because of the existence of a sizable standing army, 




























































































soldiers more than the common people (since) the soldiers could do 
more than the common people" and no regime change was likely to 
occur without their connivance or tolerance. Since then the 
situation had altered, he thought, and it had become more 
imperative to satisfy the common people "since (they) can do more 
than the soldiers" (Prince, IXI, 145). No doubt, the perpetuation 
of this imbalance of forces and the implications of this for 
republican governance lay behind Machiavelli's firm advocacy of a 
popular militia. In the more recent period, however, modern armies 
with rare exceptions are permanently standing, more-or-less 
professionally organized, hierarchically directed, and usually 
superior in their capacity for exercising violence than the common 
people or aroused elites. Soldiers (or more explicitly, their 
officers) have to be satisfied or be rendered prudentially fearful 
not only before potential opponents, but also before other actual 
supporters —  if any given authoritarian regime is to survive.
If this is the case, if the armed forces have not become so 
decadent, venal, fragmented and/or infiltrated that they can 
plausibly be defeated in a violent confrontation, then any 
strategy for peacefully exiting from authoritarian rule must 
include a military component if it is to be successful. Put in 
other terms, the armed forces, or some significant part of them, 
must become "members" of the dissenting alliance, if not by 




























































































The safest strategy is to appeal to the military and attempt 
to convince them that, as the conservative protagonists they 
usually are, they can best defend their corporate interests by 
supporting or, at the best, remaining neutral during a transfer or 
surrender of power. To act otherwise in the fact of impending 
regime demise would be to risk becoming so internally politicized, 
so ethically compromised or so functionally denatured as to risk 
losing their effective monopoly over organized violence and, 
ultimately, to be displaced or disbanded in the aftermath of a 
violent overthrow of the regime.
Much more risky —  in the likelihood either that it will lead 
to a change in regime or to eventual democratic rule —  is the 
strategy of appealing to dissident factions, interservice rivals 
or frustrated cliques of officers with blocked promotions to act 
as "aggressive protagonists" and to seize power in anticipation: 
"For when the nobles see that they cannot resist the populace, 
they begin to support one among them and make him prince in order 
to be able, under his sh'adow, to satisfy their appetites" (Prince,
IX, 108).
»
Such an alliance of conservative supporters and aggressive 
protagonists is most likely simply to perpetuate authoritarian 
rule, although with a different basis of support. Particularly 
interesting are those situations where preemptive coups of this 




























































































position by forging a populist alliance with previous subjects and 
even antagonists within their ranks.
More promising but much less frequent are seizures of power 
from within an authoritarian regime by an isolated group of its 
own protagonists (usually a military clique). If they are 
momentarily successful, their vulnerability may induce a 
spontaneous overthrow of power through the massive mobilization of 
previous subjects and repressed antagonists - a spoiling of power 
into the streets, so-to-speak —  in which not merely the regime is 
transformed but the state structure itself may be threatened.
V.BECAUSE MEN ARE FEARFUL OF ESTABLISHED POWER AND UNCERTAIN ABOUT 
THEIR PREFERENCE FOR SOME FUTURE CONFIGURATION OF POWER, CHANGES 
IN REGIME REQUIRE THE INTERVENTION OF SOME INDEPENDENT, 
UNEXPECTED OR UNCALCULABLE CIRCUMSTANCE OF SUFFICIENT MAGNITUDE 
—  INSPIRING SUFFICIENT FEAR —  TO COMPEL THEM TO REAFFIRM OR 
REVISE THEIR PREVAILING STRATEGIES OF REGIME PROTAGONISM, 
SUPPORT, CONFORMITY OR ANTAGONISM. (PCS)
So far, the demise of an authoritarian regime has been 
treated as the product of willful, calculated actions in the part 
of its defenders and a preponderance of similar actions by its 
opponents and defectors. The logic both of the struggle and its 
outcome is political and, therefore, not determined (much less




























































































These changes in the context of political choice are heavily 
mediated by such factors as the structural possibilities for 
collective action, the Koalitionsfaehigkeit of different political 
partners, the variations in consciousness, motivation and risk­
taking of individuals, the perceived feasibility of different 
means of regime change —  in short by the how, why and who 
variables I have been exploring —  before they can lead to regime 
transformation. If this assumption is correct, no amount of data 
collection and statistical manipulation which seeks merely to 
associate such an outcome with macro-economic performance, 
literacy, urbanization, social mobilization, "J curves" of social 
psychological frustration, imperatives of capital accumulation, 
stages of import substitution, crises of external dependency and 
so forth, is likely to produce compelling empirical findings, or 
even highly probabilistic numerical correlations (29).
The function of crisis-induced constraints and opportunities 
is to focus attention on the regime-level of political action and 
to compel citizens and subjects to become actors with explicit 
preferences for or against the survival of the regime. Few may 
actually take part physically in the seizure, transfer, surrender 
or overthrow of power from authoritarian rulers —  and even fewer 
may spring to its defense —  but the compelling presence of these 
"independent, unexpected or uncalculable circumstances" will have 
forced the bystanders either not to help in the defense of the 





























































































The specific acts of fortuna which have precipitated, or at 
least encouraged, the demise of authoritarian rulers seem 
extraordinarily varied. It would violate the theoretical spirit of 
this essay simply to list them; it would offend good sense to 
reduce them to one fatal flaw or inevitable contradiction.
The first generic class of circumstances consists of acts 
that lie beyond the influence of those in power. Human mortality, 
whether by unexpected cause or within actuarial prediction, places 
a limit on the tenure of even "Life Presidents". It may also 
interrupt that of "Term Dictators". Vulnerability to acts and 
opinions of foreign governments, publics, suppliers and customers 
can disrupt the capacity of authoritarian regimes, especially in 
dependent peripheral economies, to satisfy crucial interests or to 
meet normative expectations.
Circumstances that presumably lie within the calculus and 
control of authoritarian actors can also precipitate disturbing 
responses because they lead to "accidental" or unexpected results. 
Defeat in war, especially in wars which have been aggressively 
launched by authoritarian rulers themselves is among the most 
frequent of misfortunes which have led to regime change. 
Accumulated inequity in the distribution of policy benefits and 
burdens, involving such dramatic events as disruptions of supply, 
urban riots, crime waves, revelations of corruption, tax revolts, 
interracial violence and so forth, may be sufficient to 




























































































regime, although usually such manifestations of internal violence, 
disobedience, and scandal can be focused on specific agents and 
agencies, and, therefore, be deflected from the nature of the 
regime itself, or their occurence can be successfully attributed 
to "natural causes" unconnected with regime policies.
Condensing these external and internal circumstances even 
further, the demise of an authoritarian regime can be traced to 
two types of crises that are subsequently responsible for changes 
in the motives and strategies of actors and eventually for the 
mode of transformation of the regime. The first involves crises 
of leadership succession in which mortality, disablement, 
venality, disgrace, or just plain approaching of the end of one's 
term precipitate a conflict of uncertain outcome over the identity 
of individuals occupying commanding roles within the authoritarian 
regime. The second consists of crises of policy adaptation in 
which some new event or the accumulation of past mistakes makes it 
imperative, not merely to change personnel or form, but to change 
the substance of policy to the benefit and burden of groups other 
than those which were previously part of the regime.
Succession crises have their primary impact upon regime 
protagonists themselves and often take the form of a confrontation 
between "conservatives" and "aggressives" which indirectly 
involves the mobilization of regime supporters and even, in 
extreme cases, appeals to subjects or antagonists. Policy crises 




























































































supporters. "Conservative" ones are compelled to assess the 
prospects of their keeping what they have acquired if the regime 
fails to adapt to the crisis or if the regime does adapt by 
reforming its policies. "Acquisitive" supporters are likely to see 
opportunities for obtaining enlarged benefits in material and/or 
positional terms, and may seek alliances with groups of subjects 
which have also become more disposed to take new risks. Should the 
adaptation crisis upset significantly the pay-offs and restraints 
which have sufficed to ensure conformity, actors in this categoric 
disposition, especially the defensively inclined ones, may become 
potential regime antagonists —  leading to the sort of 
polarization that authoritarian regimes seek to avoid through 
their conscious cultivation of depoliticized indifference and 
resignation. Regimes simultaneously facing succession and 
adaptation crises are obviously most vulnerable to an 
unpredictable and dangerous realignment of actors and dispositions 
to take the risk of political action.
Democracies, of course, face these same generic crises 
regularly as well as unpredictably, but they have 
institutionalized procedures for dealing with them: competitive 
elections, contested primaries, parliamentary responsibility, 
checks and balances between powers, shifting legislative 
coalitions, even public opinion polling and freedom of assembly. 
However imperfect (and different) the procedures are from 
democracy to democracy, they normally provide the necessary 




























































































flexibility of response in terms of both personnel and policy to 
survive such crises without endangering the regime itself. This is 
not to argue that democracies are invulnerable, only that they are 
vulnerable to crises of a different nature and through processes 
involving different combinations of actors than authoritarian 
regimes (30 ).
Needless to say, not all crises of leadership succession 
and/or of policy adaptation will bring about the downfall of an 
authoritarian regime. Some may —  with considerable difficulty —  
manage to institutionalize a system of factional and rotational 
succession; some will survive even dramatic reversals of policy 
through scapegoating and cooptation (31). In most cases, the 
"crises" themselves will prove to be of insufficient intensity to 
provoke a necessary reassessment (32) of actor strategies with 
respect to regime type —  buried, as they are, under a patina of 
custom, indifference and prudence which grows with longevity in 
power. Nevertheless, the potentiality is there. Succession and 
adaptation crises may affect differing combinations of defensively 
and acquisitively inclined actors divided among former 
protagonists, supporters, subjects and antagonists of the regime, 
each with their differing assessments of success, failure, decay 
and delegitimation, and may eventually lead them to transform the 
authoritarian status quo through a seizure, transfer, surrender or 
overthrow of power. It is to the combinations of these ingredients




























































































VI. CRISES, ACTORS, MOTIVES AND STRATEGIES COMBINE IN A LIMITED 
NUMBER OF PREDICTABLE PATTERNS TO PRODUCE THE DEMISE OF 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES. (PCS)
Not only does the bewildering variety of circumstances 
surrounding the demise of such regimes in the real world seem to 
belie the above-stated theoretical optimism, but even when this 
variety has been validly and reliably condensed into types and 
categories, the logically possible number of combinations is 
awesome: two types of crises affecting four kinds of actors with 
four possible categories of motives to engage in one of four 
possible modal strategies. This produces 128 simple combinations, 
not to mention the enormous number of potential permutations 
within each set which might be capable of influencing the outcome.
One is tempted to respond: "Forget it!" But let me just try 
to use these categories and their attached hypotheses (actually 
they are more like rules of prudence or tendency than testable 
propositions) as a means for condensed, hopefully comparable, 
descriptions of the sequence of events, identity of actors and 
menu of motives involved in concrete instances or regime change. 
Perhaps from a sufficient quantity (and quality) of such efforts, 
one may be able to induce typical syndromes of demise, or viable 
calculuses of dissent in which generically similar crises, 
actors, motives and strategies combined to produce a 





























































































CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTERS --- ►EVALUATION OF PREVIOUS SUCCESS--
TRANSFER OF POWER
The assumptions which seem to lie behind various liberal 
apologies for dictatorship and "exceptional rule" probably
resembles this first syndrome. An authoritarian regime called into 
power to resolve "pressing national problems" has been successful 
(at least in the eyes of its protagonists and supporters), but now 
faces new problems (presumably not of its own making, but 
externally thrust upon it). An alliance forms between acquisitive 
supporters who perceive new opportunities in the changed
parameters of policy-making and conservative supporters who wish 
to retain what they have before it is threatened by a further 
extension of the crisis. With an assurance to defensive
protagonists that their vital interests will be protected 
(military rank, budget support, property rights, etc.), they 
engineer a transfer of power to themselves, perhaps widening the 
scope of representation and tolerating competition among parties 
observing strict rules of procedure. In other words, they revert 
to something approximating the status quo ante.




























































































ACQUISITIVE OR CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTERS ----» EVALUATION OF
FAILURE---> SEIZURE OF POWER
Here the "model" ends in a golpe by some subgroup of former 
protagonists. Prevented from realizing their objectives/ambitions 
by the control other protagonists have over the regime, this 
dissident "aggressive" faction seizes upon the succession crisis 
as a pretext for stressing the regime's failure to attain its 
initial objectives —  either because the regime has become 
excessively dictablanda through compromise with subjects and 
toleration of antagonists, or too dictadura to retain the needed 
conformity of most of the population. They ally with either 
acquisitive or conservative ex-supporters and seize power 
violently, although without extensive mobilization. Normally, one 
might expect this mode of demise to result only in the re­
establishment of authoritarian rule, but it may eventuate, often 
unintentionally, in something else when the isolated position of 
the golpistas forces them into wider alliances. They may even 
agree to a surrender of power, in order to retain some portion of 
it (in which case, the crisis which provoked the regime change is 
more likely to be of policy orientation than of succession).




























































































-- VALLIANCE OF AGGRESSIVE ANTAGONISTS & ACQUISITIVE SUBJECTS--- i
EVALUATION OF DELEGITIMATION & FAILURE--- OVERTHROW OF POWER
Here the crisis, calculus and sequence of responses end in a 
protracted, mass insurrection (e.g. civil war) and the victory of 
an alliance untainted by complicity with the defunct regime. The 
succession crisis is especially important in this scenario when 
coupled with the absence of legitimacy since that may both 
disorient the protagonists and galvanize the subjects out of their 
usual indifference to regime form. A calculus of dissent following 
this pattern may have to contend with Scenario No. 2 above in 
which a subset of protagonists will be seeking to exploit the same 
succession crisis and gaining supporters precisely due to the 
prospect of a mass insurrection.
VI.3. SUCCESSION CRISIS (perhaps coupled with ADAPTATION CRISIS)
VI.4. ADAPTATION CRISIS (perhaps coupled with SUCCESSION CRISIS)
---» ALLIANCE OF ACQUISITIVE SUPPORTERS & ACQUISITIVE
SUBJECTS (perhaps even DEFENSIVE ANTAGONISTS)--- » EVALUATION
OF DECAY & DELEGITIMATION ---* SURRENDER OF POWER
Here, the core of the scenario lies with an alliance of 
moderates. This brings together ex-supporters of the regime who 
regard it as neither a clear success nor an obvious failure but 
who come to question its capacity to reward them in the future and 




























































































diffusion, become increasingly susceptible to a normative 
rejection of the regime and who see in its present policy 
discomfiture a possibility for acting at less cost than in the 
past. Their preferred strategy is likely to involve a negotiated 
solution in which control over the political process is shared 
between those who supported (despite the frustration of their 
acquisitive instincts) and those who conformed (despite their 
dislike) to the defunct regime. This pact may come either in the 
form of a programmed alternation in office or a proportional 
sharing of positions in power. Such an outcome must contend with 
the less costly temptation of merely transferring power among 
subgroups of ex-supporters of the regime, and may emerge once that 
has been tried and proven incapable of commanding voluntary 
compliance, i.e., once that has been delegitimated.
These above "scenarios of demise" have been excessively 
schematic in nature and restricted in number. Presumably the 
function of empirical research —  to the extent that those 
conducting it find these categories and assumptions valuable —  
will be twofold: (1) to demonstrate the existence of other
possible modal combinations or, for that matter, the political 
"illogic" of those proposed; (2) to flesh out the schema with 
factual illustrations of the range of possible variation in the 






























































































VII. THE DEMISE OF AUTHORITARIAN PRINCE MAY BE ASSURED BY ONE OR 
MORE COMBINATIONS OF ACTORS AND STRATEGIES FOR ACTION, BUT THE 
RISE OF DEMOCRACY IS NOT PREDICTABLY ENSURED BY THE SAME 
COMBINATION OR STRATEGY. (PCS)
The mere fact that an authoritarian regime has fallen 
provides no guarantee that it will be replaced by a democratic 
one. The event itself and, above all, its aftermath is likely to 
let loose a flood of new political processes: the founding of new 
civil institutions, the mobilizing of diverse constituencies, the 
articulating of new ideologies and expectations, the discovering 
of new interests, the reshuffling of levels of governance, the 
jockeying for electoral advantage —  not to mention the more 
obvious, mundane and immediate tasks of negotiating international 
recognition and support, drafting a constitution, recruiting 
government (and party) personnel and dealing with diehard 
protagonists of the defunct regime. All these alone would be 
sufficient to place a sizeable strain on the victorious alliance, 
but they also serve to bring enormous numbers of new actors into 
the political arena —  citizens whom democracy in principle is 
committed to bringing within the polity on some equal basis. In 
short, the calculus of dissent which successfully brought down an 
authoritarian regime cannot be easily and simply transformed into 
a calculus of consent sufficient to support a democratic one.
A vast number of factors —  political, economic, social —  




























































































processes, and their exploration would take us beyond the assigned 
scope of his essay. My concluding remarks will be devoted to 
exploring the probable long-run impact of the nature of "the 
authoritarian experience" upon the viability of a democratic 
instauration or restoration.
VII. 1. THE MODE OF DEMISE OF THE AUTHORITARIAN REGIME: When 
identifying the four strategies of regime transformation, we 
already suggested that the literature, beginning with Machiavelli, 
has stressed the notion of vulnerability and the need for 
concerted violent action to achieve such ends (hence, the 
presumption of a greater likelihood that democracy would be 
restored after seizures or overthrows of power). Machiavelli went 
even further and argued that the successful founding of a new 
republican order demanded that "one man provide the means and be 
the only one from whose mind any such organization originates." 
(Discourses, I, 9, 200-201). Even his most extraordinary actions 
would be excusable, "for one should reproach a man who is violent 
in order to destroy, not one who is violent in order to mend 
things" (Discourses, I, 9, 200-1). Such a lonely "lawgiver" or 
"charismatic leader" is less likely to emerge from the compromises 
and mutual guarantees that characterize the other two modal 
strategies of demise: transfers and surrenders of power.
The problem with this scenario was already noted by 




























































































"But since the reforming of a city into 
a body politic presupposes a good man, 
and becoming prince of a republic 
through the use of violence presupposes 
an evil man —  because of this fact we 
discover that it happens only very 
rarely that a good man wishes to become 
prince though evil means, even though 
his goal may be a good one; while, on 
the other hand, we discover that it is 
equally rare for an evil man who has 
become prince to act correctly, for it 
would never ever enter his mind to 
employ that authority for a good which 
he has acquired by evil means" 
(Discourses, I, 18, 227-228) (33).
One problem, then, with seizures and overthrows of power is 
their tendency to result in concentrations of personal power and 
to reward forms of behavior hardly conducive in a subsequent 
period to law-abiding, popularly-accountable forms of government 
(34) .
Above, I have argued that ensuing changes in the 
organizational and motivational structure of politics since 
Machiavelli's time, have made dispensibility, i.e. regime demise 
from choice not necessity, an increasing likely possibility. 
Transfers and surrenders of power which leave many previous 
practices and privileges intact (at least for the moment) and 
which deliberately incorporate a "diversity of opinion" within 
their ranks may lack the singularity of will and the clear slate 
for operation that Machiavelli thought so essential to the 
founding of a new order (35). Nevertheless, their very 
inconclusiveness and the resultant need to institutionalize some 




























































































force, but also locks out militant antagonists advocating more 
extensive democratization and protagonists of the defunct regime 
advocating an authoritarian reaction (36) may provide the most 
favorable, if less heroic, grounds for establishing democratic 
order.
VII 1.A.EXCURSUS ON TYPES OF DEMOCRATIC RULE.
On this very general point, speculation about the probable 
relationship between the mode of demise and the outcome of 
transition to democracy should come to a halt. The problem lies 
in the "singular" definition of democracy as if it were some 
unitary and identical structure of practices and institutions. 
Machiavelli could assume that "republican" rule was sufficiently 
similar in nature that one could generalize about its genesis and 
maintenance (37). We cannot make that assumption about democracy 
in our time. The outcome of any given democratic transformation 
will depend to a significant degree on the type of democracy which 
actors aim to establish, or better, the type of democracy they are 
forced to compromise upon. "Democrats" usually have very different 
institutional arrangments and political practices in mind in their 
struggle against authoritarian rule. These desired arrangements 
and practices tend to correspond - not incidentally —  to the 
structure of power which democratizing actors consider will best 
guarantee the defense of their established interests or the 




























































































transition do not choose democracy tout court, but some type of 
democracy —  and the version that eventually emerges may well be a 
compromised hybrid that resembles none of their first preferences.
Unfortunately, systematic discussion of types of democracy 
has been rare; indeed, most theorizing seems to assume the
existence of only one kind of democracy —  often suspiciously
similar to the two-party, rotational, electorally-def ined
presidential "model" of the United States. All other democratic
regimes are either evolving in that direction or stuck permanently 
in some inferior, unstable configuration due to special national 
circumstances. Those few, recent efforts to classify democracies 
which exist are based in these assumptions and, hence, tend to 
confuse the structure or behavior of governing institutions with 
the social and/or cultural preconditions for their emergence. This 
mishmash not only thinly disguises the underlying normative 
preference, but makes it virtually impossible to explore cause and 
effect or historical temporal sequences in the democratization 
process (38)
While the subject deserves much more detailed and concerted 
attention than I am able to provide here, I have tried in Figure 
III to derive certain modal types of democracies using first six 
formal aspects of their political process and two substantive 
goals toward which such processes may be oriented. Placed in a 





























































































(PLACE FIGURE III HERE)
Starting from the lower end of the scale, we find recognized 
rights to public contestation of policy and personnel, exemplified 
by the "bourgeois freedoms" of speech, assembly, press, legal 
redress, etc. Polities which have only this are not really 
democracies, but liberalized authoritarian regimes (or 
dictablandas in my somewhat excentric vocabulary). Next come those 
which, in addition to the above, also permit regular election of 
predictable or uncertain outcome under conditions of participation 
and candidacy restricted by these in power. These oligarchic 
regimes were called "démocraties censitaires" since the principal 
restrictions used to involve admission to the electoral rolls by 
criteria of wealth, literacy, gender, age, etc. More recently, 
univeral. adult suffrage has become so standard that controls are 
more often levied on the nature of constituencies, the composition 
of electoral colleges, the registration of particular parties or 
the admissability of specific candidacies. For such cases, I 
propose the neo-logism: democraduras.
The next type, populist or plebiscitary democracy, has 
regular elections of predictable or uncertain outcome (more often 
the former than the latter) for highest office without 
restrictions on who can vote and run, but no reliable mechanism 
whereby executives so elected can be held accountable. The next 
threshhold is crossed precisely when a polity has regular and 
unrestricted elections of uncertain outcome, the winners of which 
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competitively elected representatives grouped in a parliament or 
legislature with effective countervailing powers. This is probably 
the type that most people would recognize as a political democracy 
in the contemporary world and it takes basically two forms 
depending on the directness of the executive selection process: 
presidential or parliamentary, with the mixed "semi-presidential" 
or "monarchie républicaine" type becoming increasingly common.
At this point, the typology introduces another element, 
namely the formula which emerges to regulate the competition among 
political parties and how they interact to produce (and reproduce) 
governing authority. In a proportional or consociational 
democracy, governments are formed either by a stable alliance of 
most parties (a Grand Coalition), none of which has a clear 
preponderance and all of which share in executive/cabinet office, 
or by a stable arrangement between parties (usually two) which 
rotate on some regular basis in the formation of governments while 
continuing to share proportionately in the filling of executive 
positions. Switzerland since the early 1920s and Belgium and the 
Netherlands (and, for a shorter period, France) in the aftermath 
of World War II represent examples of the first sub-type; Austria 
from 1945 to 1966 and Colombia from 1958 to 1974 practiced the 
second sub-type. In a majoritarian democracy, elections produce an 
irregular but possible rotation between different political 
parties exclusively responsible for executive power and enjoying a 
majority of votes in parliament (even if, in presidential systems,




























































































The United Kingdom and the United States have long been leading 
examples of this sort of democracy; the Federal Republic of 
Germany has become one more recently —  even though all three have 
passed through substantial periods of one-party preponderance. 
Swedish, Norwegian and Japanese democracy has been even more 
marked by such dominance, but the former two have experienced 
partisan rotation. For the latter, this remains only a 
possibility. A third sub-type which is not represented in Figure 
III for reasons of limited space could be called trasformista 
democracy in honor of Italy which has been its most notable 
practioner. In it, one finds neither a fixed proportionate sharing 
of governmental responsibility nor a rotational one, but 
protracted non-majoritarian dominance by a single "core" party 
which shifts its alliances with other minority parties and 
factions to form a government in response to the fluctuating 
uncertainty of electoral preferences, and puts together differing 
legislative majorities in response to unpredictable shifts in the 
issues to be resolved. Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium seem 
to have evolved in this direction in recent decades.
Beyond this point in the scalogram, the criteria shift from 
form to substance, from procedures to policies. A social democracy 
is a regime that uses political power (of taxation, regulation, 
public ownership, etc.) deliberately to redistribute benefits more 
equally throughout society. In principle, any kind of regime can 
do this. Indeed, some very authoritarian or oligarchic ones have 




























































































benefitted large categories of the population —  even if, upon 
closer examination, they have rarely taken goods, wealth, income 
or rights away from their privileged "citizens" and 
paternalistically bestowed them on their less fortunate 
"subjects". As indicated in Figure III it is somewhat more 
predictable that populist democracies and majoritarian democracies 
will pursue such policies. In the case of proportional 
democracies, once-and-for-all redistributions of benefits may be a 
part of the initial "consociational pact", but one suspects that 
they are less likely to develop in that direction than are those 
polities in which majority power can really be mobilized through 
normal political channels.
Finally, a radical democracy is a regime which seeks to 
equalize the distribution of citizen control over social and 
economic resources and not just over specific, politically 
determined, benefits. This involves penetrating into (and, in some 
cases, expropriating) institutions outside the strictly political 
realm, e.g. firms and families. Whether this can be done while 
maintaining all or even some of the procedural traits of political 
democracy is, of course, a matter of great dispute. Usually, this 
type of democracy ensues from a revolutionary upheaval in which 
the level of internal violence and external threat make it very 
tempting to "suspend" democratic rights and forms. Once thing is 
very clear. Once they have been suspended for some time, 




























































































Like all static scalograms, Figure III should not be read as 
implying an ineluctable cumulative sequence of historical 
transformation in which the less frequent attributes are 
necessarily acquired later or in which the prior, more frequently 
occuring "steps" must be taken before moving on to the next. For 
example, accountability to parliament was often acquired long 
before regular elections of uncertain outcome with universal 
(male) enfranchisement, e.g. Great Britain; while elsewhere, e.g. 
the German Second Reich, widespread suffrage anteceded effective 
executive accountability.
Once all these types of democracy have been tried —  and, in 
some cases, they are simultaneously "on display" among the world's 
polities —  the actors involved in a transition from authoritarian 
rule may pick and close from among them. They certainly are no 
longer compelled to repeat the same historical sequences that went 
into their original development. Some may seem at a given moment 
to be performing particularly well and serve as "models" for 
initiation, e.g. the Gaullist regime of the Fifth French Republic 
for Southern European countries. In more general terms, actors 
with different resources to "invest" in politics —  numbers, 
property, income, expertise, popular leadership, ethnic loyalty, 
class consciousness, and so forth -- will tend to prefer different 
types of democracy since each of these will earn a different rate 
of return depending on what procedural rules and substantive goals 
are elaborated during the transition —  and eventually enshrined 




























































































More speculatively, it may be possible to trace a connection 
between the circumstances or type of demise of the preceeding 
authoritarian regime and the likely type of democracy which will 
emerge. Using the categories developed above, I would suggest the 
following hypotheses:
(1) Where there has been a seizure of power, dominant actors 
are likely to be divided between those in favor of a mere 
liberalization of authoritarian rule (dictablanda) and those in 
favor of some type of populist democracy with plebiscitary 
consultations but no effective executive accountability; (2) 
after a transfer of power, the conservative and centrist ex­
supporters of the defunct regime will prefer oligarchic democracy 
(democradura) with indirect elections, restricted franchise, 
partisan exclusions and/or invulnerable executives, but their 
likely need for an alliance with moderate ex-subjects may make 
some form of parliamentary or presidential outcome a necessary 
compromise (hence, the contemporary appeal of the ambiguously 
designed, Gaullist "monarchie présidentielle"); (3) in the event 
of a surrender of power with its wider and more heterogeneous 
mobilization of support, the choice will most likely lie between 
either of the proportional formulas? fixed quotas for the sharing 
of offices and benefits, or fixed, periodic rotation in office, or
else the failure to reach agreement of relative shares may
compell actors to accept a majoritarian arrangement in which
potential rotation is left to the uncertainty of acquiring




























































































through mass insurrection led by ex-antagonists opens up new 
possibilities for the substantive content of democratization and 
renders quite ambiguous the form that democratic institutions may 
take. In this case, populist democracy under a loosely organized, 
weakly constraining dominant party will be difficult due to the 
high level of mobilization and autonomy of action of 
insurrectionists-cum-revolutionar ies. Proportionality will be 
impossible (and unnecessary) to establish in the aftermath of the 
destruction of so many pre-existing institutions; rotation in 
office will appear at best wasteful, at worst subversive of the 
high-risk effort which has just been successfully accomplished. 
Social democracy with its policy redistributions and ameliorations 
may look attractive if a stable, dominant majoritarian alliance 
can be forged, but most likely is the emergence of some type of 
radical democracy which will not respect the restricted rights, 
procedures and organizational forms of non-radical, i.e. 
"bourgeois", democracy. '
VII.2. The longevity of the defunct regime.
One patent difference among authoritarian regimes is the 
length of time they have endured or survived. At one extreme, we 
find cases in which no living person is likely to remember or to 
have participated in any other type of regime. Virtually the 
entire political personnel and citizenry has been socialized, 
indoctrinated, recruited or repressed under authoritarian 




























































































such a fleeting (or episodic) experience that the defunct regime 
never really managed to institutionalize or consolidate itself in 
power, and most prospective actors have vivid memories of and 
commitments to competitive political parties, free associational 
life, civic liberties, etc.
Clearly, the former case rules out any simple "parenthetic" 
outcome, that is, restoring the previous form of democracy by 
recalling its practices, personnel and parties. "The changes 
(that) are healthy (and) bring bodies back to their beginning" 
(Discourses, III, Intro., 351) have become simply impossible to 
effect. Lengthy, "non-democratic interludes" also have a skewed 
impact on the nature of regime antagonists, diminishing the 
survival chances of loosely-organized, moderate ones and leaving 
the field to well organized, clandestine organizations. Even 
after a very long "lapse", however, seemingly defunct labels and 
loyalties can be resurrected (40), and hard-core para-military 
groups do not necessarily gain an incordinate advantage. At least, 
there will probably be some recognizable groups which can bargain 
with each other to effect a transition.
Situations of episodic, unconsolidated authoritarian 
experiences may make a negotiated transition more difficult due 
to the relative absence of coherent and organized interlocutors 
who know and can guarantee the protection of minimal institutional 
interests. Here, the problem may well be that democratic leaders 




























































































returnees is likely to be heavily marked by personal resentment 
and may be too threatening to the incumbent protagonists of the 
regime, while authoritarian practices appear to them not to have 
been given a sufficient chance to perform their assigned function 
or satisfy their preferred interests. In other words, the 
resistance to regime transformation by incumbents may be inversely 
proportionate to their length of stay in power.
A more difficult issue to resolve is the impact of 
protracted, i.e. several generational, authoritarian rule upon 
popular values, images of authority, expectations of performance, 
habits of interaction, etc. The question is not whether the 
defunct regime was congruent with some transcendent, "national 
character" or "political culture", but whether it was successful 
in inculcating in the populous and/or in significant elites a set 
of supportive values shaping the ends and means of political 
action. Deliberate efforts at "civic and moral education" have 
usually been farcical and contributed more to a political culture 
of cynicism than to one directly and self-consciously supportive 
of authoritarian rule, but might this "non-enthusiastic", 
alienated political culture of Realpolitik, dissimulation and 
disgust not pose a formidable obstacle to the spontaneity, loyalty 
and trust necessary for the unpredictable give-and-take
characteristic of most types of democracy? Machiavelli though not 
unless the long-reigning prince had completely erradicated all 
"ancient institutions" and, thereby, corrupted the society. He




























































































astonishing civic maturity, revive rather quickly their enthusiasm 
for politics, establish strong loyalties even to new and untested 
leaders and learn to trust even uncertain allies and unknown 
opponents —  when given the opportunity during a transition to 
democracy. He certainly hoped that this would happen in his 
beloved Florence if its republican status had been restored.
VII.3. The Circumstances of Authoritarian Advent to Power. Just as 
authoritarian regimes meet their demise in several modes, so they 
come to power in a wide variety of ways and in contexts of quite 
different political intensity. Quasi-legal Machtergreifung, 
external imposition and armed civil conflict illustrate a few of 
the possibilities, although coup d'état has been the modal route. 
Some such transformations are relatively peaceful and low in 
threat perception; others leave a bloody trail of victims and a 
fearful set of victors. It can be argued that all forms of 
governance receive some "genetic imprint" from the circumstances 
of their instauration. Authoritarian ones, perhaps, receive a 
peculiar heritage since they are often subsequently required to 
stress the "revolutionary" nature of their extraordinary and 
unconstitutional founding and to overdramatize the magnitude of 
the crisis which motivated their seizure of power. They do so 
without, however, either the consequent large-scale social, 
economic and political changes which might consolidate a new 
"historical bloc" in power, or the subsequent systematic-categoric 




























































































remove such prospective antagonists from contention for power in 
the future.
Violent resolutions of crises perceived as threatening the 
very existence of political actors —  civil war over the nature of 
national identity represents the extreme instance; class struggle 
over the ownership of the means of production is a somewhat less 
intensive one —  leave the sort of birthmark that is likely to 
make a negotiated transfer or surrender or power more difficult, 
although this structural determinant clearly varies inversely with 
that of longevity in power since subsequent social and economic 
transformation is likely to erode some of the bases of the genetic 
conflict and since revanchiste motives may be expected to diminish 
during intergeneration transfer. Perhaps the most favorable 
context for democratic restoration occurs when the defunct regime 
has the genetic imprint of "external imposition". Blaming foreign 
aggressors will not always suffice, however, since it may serve to 
raise the delicate issue of the configuration of internal 
political forces which proved incapable of preventing such an 
imposition or which collaborated to make its prolongation feasible 
—  vide the eternal French controversies over the Vichy regime.
VII.4. The Social Basis of Prior Authoritarian Rule. Observing 
that prototype of modern authoritarian rule, the Second Empire of 
Napoléon III, Karl Marx concluded that its social basis was both 




























































































during the short period of his personal observation as one of an
iterative narrowing of support whereby the allies used today to
expell or exclude yesterday's participants in power become the
next day's victims, and so forth —  until its executive power
stood completely independent from civil society and isolated from
political support, based only on physical intimidation ("the rifle
*
butt"). Ergo, authoritarian regimes have social support, albeit of 
a varied and shifting nature, i.e, they are not simply tyrannies, 
and their historical evolution tends toward a progressive 
narrowing and homogenization of that support base, i.e., they have 
difficulty recuperating supporters once they have been excluded, 
and attracting new supporters from the ranks of subjects and 
antagonists.
What seems crucial to the eventual prospects for democracy, 
as well as for the type of democracy, is that authoritarian 
regimes backed by a more heterogeneous coalition of social forces 
ate likely to have been already ruled by some process —  however 
invisible and private —  of negotiation and compromise. Marx was 
convinced that Napoléon Ill's efforts to please such a variety of 
interests, and not be uniquely accountable to any of them, would 
result in contradictory policies, stalemated outcomes, growing 
disaffection and regime demise in the near future. The Second 
Empire proved more resilient than he imagined; nevertheless, the 
fact that it at one time or another appealed to and was supported 
by diverse "constituencies ", no doubt facilitated the successful 




























































































many had been compromised with it that it was difficult to draw a 
sharp distinction between "insiders" and "outsiders", and because 
its policy processes already contained the sort of interest 
exchanges, procedural arrangements and substantive compromises 
conducive to viable democracy. Where an authoritarian regime 
becomes more narrowly based by successive purges and defections of
4
previous supporters/beneficiaries, the behavior of its hardcore 
beneficiaries and frustrated protagonists will add disturbing 
elements to the already uncertain transition period. Conversely, 
where authoritarian rule has been the more consistent product of a 
narrow band of institutional, ethnic, regional and/or class 
interests, it will be easier to identify and isolate its 
supporters, to brand them as mere usurpers, and to banish them 
from the political life of the successor regime.
Also important is the institutional autonomy of the 
supporters and subjects of the defunct authoritarian regime. In 
those cases where it has managed successfully to penetrate the 
leadership structures of such relatively autonomous and pre­
existing hierarchies as the Church, the civil service (to the 
extent it exists), the business community, the military, local 
notables, provincial elites etc., the process of transition will 
be hindered by the compromised nature of these institutions. 
Democratization will be contingent upon their fragmentation and 
reorganization. In the short run, it will not be able to take 
advantage of their member loyalties and institutional resources. 




























































































subjects —  provided they neither tolerated nor opposed it —  or 
where it encapsulated and repressed them as antagonists, these 
institutions are likely to become important sources of leadership 
and followership in any ensuing democratic political process.
What seems crucial in assessing the likely impact of the 
differing social bases of authoritarian rule upon the transition 
to democracy can be summed up in the concept, introduced above, 
of dispensability. I am not referring in this case to that famous 
verselbstaendige Macht der Exekutivgewalt whereby the previous 
regime in its relative autonomy could presumably dispense with any 
particular element or configuration of class support, but its 
obverse: the extent to which a given class (or institution, ethnic 
group, regional elite, etc.) can dispense with a particular 
configuration of political power and still survive with its 
perceived vital interests intact. Just as the relation between 
the Roman Catholic Church and the state in Western Europe was 
significantly altered in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century 
by the Church's discovery that it could afford to be "indifferent" 
to republicanism and parliamentary democracy, so it seems of 
considerable importance to the prospects for democracy in the 
present period, that classes, sectors, professions, ethnies, etc., 
learn that their very survival does not depend on a perpetuation 
of authoritarian rule. This perception of dispensability, more 
crucial to contemporary outcomes than that of vulnerability, is 
encouraged by two dramatically different social configurations: 




























































































rather broad spectrum of interests and made only weak efforts at 
infiltrating or penetrating the institutional apparatuses 
defending those interests; the other in which the regime had a 
quite narrow and exclusivistic base and sought to control and 
subordinate the pre-existing autonomous institutions of civil 
society.
VII.5. The Role of the Military Under the Previous Regime. While 
the collaboration or complicity of those most immediately in 
control of the instruments or organized violence is pivotal to the 
survival of any type of regime, one could argue for its even 
greater significance in authoritarian ones. So much so, that they 
are frequently (and often misleadingly) labelled "military 
dictatorships".
Again, one can easily observe a rather wide range of 
"situations" in the relationship between the armed forces and 
authoritarian rule which interest us. Their role in the 
instauration of such regimes varies from facilitative and passive 
complicity, _to exclusive and active responsibility with all matter 
of civil-military alliances in between. Their occupancy of formal 
executive and administrative roles varies from confinement to 
positions in their own corporate hierarchy, to usurpation of all 
positions of decisional importance. Their identification with the 
policy goals of the regime ranges from episodic intervention to




























































































the direction and implementation of virtually all policy choices. 
Their mode of political action runs from individual and peaceful 
expressions of personal and/or professional opinion, _to corporate 
and coercive assertions of sovereign authority, with a wide "menu" 
of strategic and tactical alternatives lying between these 
extremes.
The special significance of the role of the military in 
transitions to democracy stems, on the one hand, from the close 
symbolic association (in their own eyes and those of the general 
public) between this set of institutions and the defunct regime 
and, on the other, from its varying degree of direct 
responsibility for substantive policy actions of that regime. 
Where the situation resembles the "heavy end" of the above range 
of variance —  i.e. the more it approaches outright military 
dictatorship —  the more difficult it will be for the military as 
a corporation to adopt a stance of dispensability with respect to 
the outgoing regime and to accept a transfer or surrender of power 
without armed resistance. It is unlikely to accept, with passive 
or benign indifference, its replacement by a democratic regime. 
In all instances, there will be a sensitive "military question", 
but the lesser the symbolic and substantive connections, the 
easier it will be to resolve by negotiation and compromise.
The entire situation may, of course, be vastly complicated or 
simplified by the context of national and international security 




























































































been defeated in war and countries which have been occupied by 
foreign powers are not likely to be in a position to make and 
enforce decisions about the nature and policies of an ensuing 
regime. Inverse situations in which the security context is 
perceived as so favorable that an incumbent regime might 
conceivably disband the existing armed forces altogether or 
transform them in a mere police force are —  alas —  rare, but 
their mere possibility is likely to strengthen military resistance 
to any form of regime transformation. Normally, however, the 
military as a distinctive, semi-autonomous, hierarchic corporation 
can expect to survive the demise of authoritarian rule and to 
accommodate itself to various forms of democracy. The issues at 
stake, therefore, revolve around the fate of individual officers, 
special units, established professional practices, existing levels 
of budgetary support and so forth. While always sensitive, these 
issues seem most tractable, and the prospects for a transition to 
democracy best, where the armed forces have maintained a 
relatively high degree of corporate unity and professional 
consciousness, where their policy role and command over resources 
have not expanded greatly, where their symbolic identification 
with the outgoing regime has ben low (or buried in the distant 
past), and where their alloted tasks in the provision of national 





























































































VII. 6. The Institutional Format of the Defunct Regime. Because so 
many institutions of authoritarian rule bear the same labels: 
parties, elections, legislatures, local governments, unions, 
plebiscites, etc., but perform quite differently from their 
democratic counterparts, there is a tendency to dismiss them out- 
of-hand, and to overlook their potential significance in the 
transition process. Students of authoritarian rule may be vaguely 
aware of these ritualistic and formalistic practices, but they 
typically and justifiably have inquired into less visible 
mechanisms of power and influence in their efforts at explaining 
the policies of such regimes. I remember my amusement at 
discovering that Portugal had held more national elections than 
any other European country between 1932 and 1974, and my suprise 
once I delved into the conduct of these elections at their, often 
latent and to a degree unintended, consequences for the regime's 
perpetuation in power (41).
Consider again the substantial range of variation across 
authoritarian experiences and across time within any given 
experience. Elections for legislative and/or executive office may 
be simply abolished; held and then cancelled; tolerated at one 
level and suppressed at another; made indirect in some areas or 
at some levels and left direct elsewhere; held unpredictably with 
uncertain rules and fradulent practices and/or conducted regularly 
under highly institutionalized (if unequal) procedures. 
Enfranchisement may disappear; decrease; remain constant and/or 




























































































manipulated, and/or made obligatory. Parties may be actively 
surpressed; passively tolerated; extensively purged; replaced by 
an official movement; reformed and manipulated in number and 
performance; allowed to form under restrictive conditions and/or 
alloted a fixed quota of seats. Legislatures may be shut down; 
periodically recessed; packed with hand-picked appointees; shifted 
to a functional basis and/or rendered impotent. Workers' 
organizations may be abolished; purged; discouraged; controlled; 
subsidized and/or corporatized. Employer's and professional 
associations may be intervened; reformed; encouraged; ignored; 
corporatized and/or brought into the higher circles of power. 
Local governments imay be eliminated; intervened; appointed; 
subordinated; subsidized; and/or just be left alone.
As the prospect of even a liberalization of practices emerges 
or the spectre of a regime transition appears, one may belatedly 
applaud the existence of arrangments and institutions previously 
scorned as "pseudo-democratic". On the one hand, they can be a 
significant source of leaders for the transition who are both 
recognizable to wider publics and acceptable to authoritarian 
rulers by virtue of their previous, "responsible", behavior. 
However manipulated and fradulent, the parties, interest
associations, civic subgroups, legislatures, local governments, 
etc., of an authoritarian regime do possess some physical 
resources —  if only, a building, mimeo machine and address book - 
and human skills —  knowledge of parliamentary procedure, 




























































































organization —  which can otherwise be in short supply, especially 
in those cases where most of the potential replacement personnel 
have been in jail or exile.
On the other hand, the very existence of such anomalous 
practices within an authoritarian regime is indirect evidence of 
the persistence of democratic values and aspirations in civil 
society and of the regime's efforts to gain some legitimation from 
their invocation and manipulation. Popular sovereignty, citizen 
equality, electoral enfranchisement, constituent accountability, 
partisan representation, mass participation, voluntary 
associability, even majority rule, are not merely keep alive as 
symbols by such pseudo-democratic gestures as acclamatory 
plebiscites, rigged elections, impotent assemblies and 
officialized interest representation, but they can also serve as 
standards against which actual performance is evaluated and future 
behavior can be projected.
Before simply concluding that the greater the pseudo- 
democratic component in a given authoritarian experience, the 
greater the prospects for a successful democratic re-or 
instauration, I should express some reservations. It is not 
impossible that some of the pretensions of the defunct regime to 
representing a superior form of democracy: "authoritarian", 
"corporatist", "organic", "presidential". "authentically 
national", "incorruptible", "orderly", etc., will draw support 




























































































eventually be used in attempts to discredit the "disorderly", 
"inauthentic", "foreign-inspired", "partisan" efforts of 
succeeding democratic politicians. Paradoxically, while such 
labels and practices may prove ineffective in legitimating the 
performance of authoritarian regimes in power, they can provide 
the basis for a certain nostalgia and popular aura once these 
"fathers of the people" have been removed from power —  and once 
the population has been exposed to the intrinsic uncertainty and 
divisiveness of democratic politics.
Also, one should not overlook the fact the "pseudo-democracy" 
has had the effect of co-opting institutions and drawing a 
substantial number of individuals into a network of, at least 
implicit, complicity with the defunct authoritarian regime. In 
situations where there emerges, due to internal exclusion or 
external banishment, a clearly untainted and manifestly heroic set
of antagonists, e.g. "partisans" , they are likely to interpret the
complicity of these individuals and institutions as evidence of
opportunism and insincerity, and to use it as the basis for
exclusion from the process of democratic instauration. If
successful in this effort, the transition would lose not only the
human and material resources specifically created by "pseudo­
democracy", but such preemption would drastically narrow the pool 





























































































Another feature of "pseudo-democratic" practices is their 
tendency to affect differentially the levels of governance. Some 
authoritarian regimes eliminated as far as possible all tendencies 
and pretensions to autonomous participation and competition at the 
local level, but tolerated a limited and episodic degree of rival 
organizational effort and often dissension at the national level. 
Others organized their pseudo-democratic practices in a more-or- 
less inverse manner allowing much more competition, participation 
and autonomy in municipal politics than in successive layers of 
state and national government. Taking a "bottom-up" perspective on 
building democracy, the latter seems a more favorable context for 
a successful transition. Whatever the direction, the unevenness of 
experience with pseudo-democratic practices will contribute to 
some amount of disarticulation in the future as the rules of the 
political game become more congruent across levels of government.
VII.7. The Previous Mode of Repression. All authoritarian regimes 
are taxed with the heavy label, "repressive". Rightly so, for if 
they do not resort more frequently and concertedly to exclusion, 
intimidation, censorship, arrest, exile, etc., than the democratic 
regimes they succeed, one might well question whether they deserve 
the classification: authoritarian.
Nevertheless, the methods employed to repress opponents and 
the targets of that effort are by no means identical across such 




























































































authoritarian experience. They can range from fines to 
assassination, from periodic harassment to lengthy imprisonment, 
from voluntary exile to forced internment, from economic repraisal 
to political deprivation, from legal arbitrariness _to loss of all 
civic rights, from the indignity of castor oil _to excruciating 
torture. The targets of repression may vary from active individual 
opponents to their families and associates, from actual members of 
specified opposition organizations to all believers in vaguely 
delineated subversive doctrines, from particular expressions of 
opinion and literature to all non-conformist acts of artistic 
creativity, from those self-consciously active in political 
struggle to entire categories of people based on class, religious, 
regional, ethnic identity.
Variations in the patterns of repression employed by 
authoritarian regimes would seem to affect the prospects for 
eventual democratization in two principal ways. Most directly, 
they condition (if not establish) the nature of the opposition, 
parts of which might be expected to collaborate in a negotiated 
transition, other parts of which are likely to persist in their 
intransigent efforts to bring about a ruptura and, hence, to 
obtain the sort of victory which will vindicate their suffering 
and enable them to extract revenge upon their tormentors. 
Repression which has been sharply and deliberately discriminatory 
among types or categories of political opponents is likely to 
widen the gap between those willing to compromise and those 




























































































has been widespread, indiscriminant and even arbitrary it may not 
lead to such a clear demarcation among opponents —  although, 
where aimed at a whole ethnic, linguistic, regional group, it may 
lead that group into a distinctive strategy of opposition.
A rather special problem emerges when repression produces a 
large exile community. If its members emigrated voluntarily out of 
a calculus of fear, self-interest and anticipated reaction, their 
eventual return may pose delcate problems of adjustment and 
alliance with similarly minded, usually moderate, opponents who 
remained (and who are often implicated in the authoritarian 
regime's pseudo-democratic institutions). Involuntary expellees, 
especially when their stay abroad was sponsored or subsidized by 
an external power, raise different issues. They may find 
themselves excluded by law or by political isolation from 
participating in a democratic reconstruction. In all cases, 
repression which has involved formal loss of citizenship and 
property involves the issues of amnesty (its timing, 
comprehensiveness, etc.), indemnification for, and/or recuperation 
of losses, often of goods appropriated by individual and 
institutional supporters of the outgoing regime. Dictablandas 
which have utilized more selective, individualistic and episodic 
forms of repression, which have not so much exiled as encapsulated 
their antagonists, and which have deprived them more of 
opportunities than of possessions do not leave such a difficult 




























































































The principal indirect impact of differing patterns of 
repression affects, not the victims, but the beneficiaries of 
authoritarian rule and involves the specific agents and agencies 
repsonsible for such poliies. Where the means have been moderate, 
especially relative to those prevailing before the authoritarian 
experience, and the targets have been selective, and, therefore 
not involved large numbers of innocents, subjects, etc., cosmetic 
changes in the law, judicial system and legal profession coupled 
with purges of individual police and military officials and the 
dismantlement of particular agencies may suffice. But where 
extreme measures of physical coercion were used and widespread 
victimization occurred, then the transiton to democracy will 
inevitably raise the demand for effective institutional guarantees 
against future recurrence and for exemplary punishment of those 
responsible. Anticipating such a likelihood, those protagnoists 
involved in the administration of repression form the hard-core of 
resistance to a democratic transition, and they usually have at 
their disposition the means to disrupt it by agents provocateurs, 
terrorist acts, etc. Perhaps the strongest argument against a 
lengthy transfer or surrender of power in such contexts is the 
time it gives to this group to act in defense of its interests.
VIII. CONCLUSION: This essay has been written in a "Machiavellian 
Mood" for what may be a "Machiavellian Moment" in the history of 
Southern Europe and Latin America. My mood was set at first 




























































































commentators on the initial proposal, by the timely suggestions of 
a friend who specializes in Italian renaissance literature and by 
a lengthy visit to Florence for other reasons. It was 
subsequently reinforced by my growing conviction that, more than 
any other theorist and certainly more than any contemporary 
theorist of "political development", Machiavelli provides a 
substantive and a methodological basis for understanding the 
issues involved in regime change. He focuses relentlessly on two 
alternative forms of governance: princely and republican rule, 
remarkably isomorphic to the authoritarian/democratic choice 
facing some contemporary polities in Southern Europe and Latin 
America. Moreover, he does so by delineating generic categories of 
motivation and action, and by tracing their logical consequences 
in a manner which is neither spatially nor temporally restricted. 
With appropriate adjustments in the characteristics of actors and 
modernizations in vocabulary it is not difficult to transpose his 
thought to the present age. Most appealing to me was the way he 
avoids the simplistic and misleading reductionism prevalent in so 
much recent theorizing on the subject of regime change by 
recognizing both the constraints imposed by necessity and custom, 
and the opportunities available to choice and audacity.
After exploiting, perhaps obsessively, this "discovery", my 
attention was drawn to the possibility that it was not purely 
coincidental that I had found Machiavelli so appropriate. A recent 
book by J.G.A. Pocock suggests that there are "Machiavellian 




























































































created by Machiavelli become uniquely appropriate to analyzing 
politics (42). Could it be that contemporary Southern Europe and 
Latin America are in such a moment?
By Pocock's account, the answer would appear to be negative 
for he identifies the Machiavellian Moment with ""the time in 
which the republic is seen as confronting its own temporal 
finitude, as attempting to remain morally and politically stable 
in a stream of irrational events conceived as destructive of all 
systems of secular stability" (p. viii). Here, the problem is 
posed as that of a waning in republican virtu, of a decline of 
faith in the active, popular civic life in the face of the 
corrupting influence of unbridled powerseekers and self-regarding 
interests, and the uncertain effect of international competition 
and economic cupidity.
If anything, the "moment" in Southern Europe and Latin 
America is the inverse. The problem is (re)founding, not 
preserving, a republican-cum-democratic order. How can these 
polities regenerate a vita activa and a vivere civile out of an 
"unlegitimated world governed by for tuna" in which naked power, 
unreflective custom and pure improvisation have ruled for so long 
and so undermined the republic vision of a civic humanism and the 
democratic aspiration for a social justice? That is the question.
And it is not one for which Machiavelli has a convincing 




























































































founding civic communities, and establishing statutes and new 
institutions, ... the people are so much more superior in 
maintaining the things thus established that they attain, without 
a doubt, the same glory as those who established them".
(Discourses, I, 58, 285). The quality needed to found a virtuous 
order is individual not civic in nature, and, as we have seen, it 
will take evil acts (43) and an evil man to accomplish such a 
difficult task and who can realistically expect such an actor to 
step aside once he has accomplished that? Innovative political 
action, precisely because it disturbs prevailing custom and 
ingrained corrupt practices, requires exceptional "leadership" 
properties, but those individuals who are likely to have them are 
the least likely to hand them over to a reestablished citizenry 
for their future maintenance.
The problem for the polities of Southern Europe and Latin 
America which are undergoing a prospective regime transformation, 
then, lies in a different kind of Machiavellian Moment. They 
cannot simply rely on the preservation or resuscitation of 
republican virtues and democratic ideals. They must forge new 
ones. And, on the way Machiavelli warns us, they will be 
dangerously exposed to the whims of fortune and the temptations of 
corruption. The answer, hopefully, lies in the emergence of some 
new "collective prince" with the audacity (virtù) of the singular




























































































Antonio Gramsci had, of course, arrived at this conclusion 
some time ago: "The modern prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a 
real person, a concrete individual, it can only be an organism; a 
complex element of society in which the cementing of a collective 
will, recognized and partially asserted in action, has already 
begun" (44). Providentially, historical development was producing 
(he thought) such a collective agent: the cohesive, centralizing 
and disciplined mass political party, for which the Jacobins were 
the prototype and the Communist Party, hopefully, the archetype. 
Unfortunately for contemporary Southern Europe and Latin America, 
such well-organized, socially penetrative and programatically 
coherent, "hegemonic" parties (whether communist or not) have 
rarely emerged as agents of the demise of authoritarian rule or 
even as the byproducts of transition toward democracy. Actors in 
these contexts must face the cruel paradox that what may be 
necessary for the successful founding of a viable civic polity can





























































































1. One is tempted to regard all this as a confirmation of the 
malicious accusation (of unknown authorship) that social 
scientists only manage to explain something to their 
collective satisfaction once it has already disappeared or 
changed into something else. Marx asserted that societies 
only pose those problems to themselves which they stand some 
chance of resolving. Social scientists, par contre, only seem 
to answer satisfactorily those questions which no longer 
exist.
2. See the essays in David Collier (ed.), The New
Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979) by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Albert 
Hirschman and Guillermo O'Donnell, all members of the 
Academic Advisory Committee of the Woodrow Wilson Center.
3. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter with the
assistance of Abraham F. Lowenthal and Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, "Prospects for Democracy: Transition from
Authoritarian Rule - A Proposal for a Series of Discussions 
at the Wilson Center", Washington, D.C., April 1979.
4. While in part the product of convenience and personal
inclination, this division of labor is based on an important 
theoretical assumption— that the demise of established
authoritarian rule and the emergence of viable democracy are 
two different occurences. Fritz Stern may have been the first 
to defend this premise openly: "the implicit thesis of the 
book (is that) the disintegration of the Weimar Republic and 
the rise of Nazism were two distinct if obviously overlapping 
historical processes. By 1932, the collapse of Weimar had 
become inevitable; Hitler's triumph had not." T. Eschenburg 
et al. The Path to Dictatorship 1918-1933 (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Anchor Books, 1966), p~. xvii. Inverting the direction of
regime transformation, we would assert that, beyond some 
point, the collapse or displacement of a given authoritarian 
regime becomes unavoidable, but the prospect of a democratic 
outcome has not therefore become inevitable.
5. All the direct citations from Machiavelli are taken from a 
new translation and the page references are to Peter 
Bondanella and Mark Musa (eds. and transl.) The Portable 
Machiavelli (New York: Penguin Books, 1979).
6. Machiavelli, however, provides me with an excuse for so
proceeding: "a prudent man should always enter those paths
taken by great men and imitate those who have been most 
excellent, so that if one's own skill does not match theirs, 
at least it will have the smell of it." (Prince, VI, 92).
7. This should not be read so as to exclude the possibility of 
an unintended, "accidental", regime change in which actors 




























































































regime make demands and pursue policies which irrevocably 
undermine the regime's viability. While this would seem to be 
a rare occurrence, any realistic theory of regime
transformation should incorporate the possibility that
crucial actors may be unaware of what is at stake.
8. Machiavelli, although he relied heavily on illustrations from
the past (and a few from his present) to support his 
assertions, did not use them as the basis for deriving them. 
He was also skeptical about the quality of his "data base": 
"I believe we do not know the complete truth about antiquity; 
most often the facts that would discredit those times are 
hidden and other matters which bestow glory upon them are 
reported magnificently and most thoroughly" (Discourses II, 
Intro. 28F). Modern authoritarian regimes possess greater 
means to hide "discrediting" events and amplify "magnificent" 
ones, but their efforts are at least partially cancelled out 
by a much greater variety of sources for data. Nevertheless, 
the sullen persistence of most authoritarian regimes
contrasts with the noisy travails of almost any democracy.
9. The threat of violence must be sufficiently credible and
salient, not only to those in power to command their concern, 
but also to those out of power so that the rulers cannot 
"keep the populace occupied with festivals and spectacles" 
(Prince, XXI, 153).
10. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of
Democratic Regimes (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1978), pp. 3-124.
11. Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic 
Model", Comparative Politics II, 3 (April 1970), pp.337-364.
12. Please excuse the sexism, but it stems from my feeble attempt 
to imitate Machiavelli's style.
13. Machiavelli puts it more poetically later in the Discourses: 
"We are endowed by Nature with the power and wish to desire 
everything and by Fortune with the ability to obtain little 
of what we desire. The result is an unending discontent in 
the minds of men and a weariness with what they possess: this 
makes men curse the present, praise the past and hope in the 
future, even though they do this with no reasonable motive" 
(II, Intro., 290).
14. But nota bene, elsewhere, Machiavelli states that "men desire 
novelty to such an extent that those who are doing well wish 
for change as much as those who are doing badly" (Discourses 
111,11,392). Presumably these fickle-minded actors have never 
tried, or been denied, the opportunity to learn established 
ways of acting.
15. For a discussion of sultanistic and caudillistic rule, see 




























































































of Political Science, Vol.III (Reading, Mass.:Addison-Wesley, 
1975), pp.259-264.
16. Machiavelli lived "in a universe hushed in moral stillness,"
to use Sheldon Wolin's expressive phrase. Machiavelli,
himself, said of his times, "it looks as if the world were 
become effeminate (i.e.fickle-PCS) and as if Heaven were 
powerless."
17. For an analysis of Latin American military and civilian, 
competitive and non-competitive regimes which demonstrates 
empirically their "unexceptional" performance in meeting key 
economic and social goals, see my, "Military Intervention, 
Political Competitiveness, and Public Policy in Latin 
America: 1950-1967" as excerpted in A .F. Lowenthal (ed.) 
Armies and Politics in Latin America (New York & London: 
Holmes and Meier, 1976), pp.113-164.
18. Actually the label "decay" is not very appropriate. What I 
had in mind is a situation in which a regime (or its leaders) 
come to be regarded by key supporters and opponents as 
lacking Virtu: the capacity to assess changing situations, to 
recognize the unintended consequences of one's acts, and to 
modify one's potential response accordingly. A growing 
rigidity in behavior, a sclerotic incapacity to learn, a 
tendency to maximize short-run returns without regard for 
their eventual impact —  all these are the properties of a 
decadent or decayed regime in the sense I wish to use it 
here.
19. "There are two reasons why we cannot change ourselves: first, 
because we cannot oppose the ways in which nature inclines 
us; second, because once a man (and especially, an agency - 
PCS) has truly prospered by means of one method of procedure 
it is impossible to convince him that he can benefit by 
acting otherwise." (Discourses 111,9,383).
>
20. While it seems to be the presupposition of numerous analysts 
that the present period has none of the "moral stillness" 
that so plagued Machiavelli's time, and that "non-democratic" 
forms of governance are eo ipso incapable of legitimating 
themselves in such a democratic age —  in contrast to the 
interwar period —  this has never to my knowledge been 
empirically demonstrated. The fact, however, that so many 
authoritarian rulers (in Latin America, if not in Southern 
Europe) promise an eventual return to democratic practices 
could be taken as indirect evidence for the existence and 
strength of such values.
21. In his discussion of the "goodness" of German society and, 
hence, its appropriateness for republican rule, Machiavelli 
stressed that "(the Germans) do not have many dealings with 
their neighbors...(hence) have had no opportunity to acquire 
the custom of France, Spain or Italy —  nations which taken 




























































































they "do not allow any of their citizens to be or to live irt 
the style of a gentleman; indeed, they maintain among 
themselves a complete equality." (Discourses 111,6,326).
22. Setting aside for the moment the probable existence of a 
large, intermediary coalition of indifférents and attentistes 
who merely wish to be free from politics and will conform to 
whatever regime emerges provided it leaves them more-or-less 
alone.
23. Machiavelli, himself an exile, called attention to "how 
dangerous it is to believe those who have been driven from 
their native city..." (Discourses 111,30,348). Perhaps 
fortunately, exiles rarely have played a significant role in 
authoritarian regime transformation, but they have 
occasionally been a factor complicating the politics of 
successor regimes.
24. "Many are led to conspire as a result of too many favors 
rather than too many injuries" (Discourses 111,6,361).
25. "Where in other principalities one has only to contend with 
the ambition of the nobles and the arrogance of the people, 
the Roman emperors had a third problem: they had to endure 
the cruelty and the avarice of soldiers" (Prince, XIX, 
p.140).
26. Machiavelli preferred the term "fickle" when it came to 
preferences for future states based on "love," "reason," or 
lack of experience.
27. Machiavelli, of course, referred to this as "fortuna."
28. Hence, the approach is similar to that taken by Juan Linz in
his essay in the Linz and Stepan (eds.) Breakdown of
Democracy p.3-124.
29. The static cross-sectional, cross-national, correlations
between regime type and imagined "structural requisites" look 
impressive. The cross-temporal, infra-national analyses aimed 
at explaining the specific timing and direction of regime 
transformation in a single polity are a lot less convicing - 
if at all.
30. Cf. the abundant speculation and documentation in Juan Linz 
and Alfred Stepan (eds.), (op.cit.).
31. Machiavelli saw little chance for purely incremental,
reformist solutions to regime-level problems:"for it takes a 
prudent man who can see defects from far off and in their 
initial stages in order to reform them gradually and it is 
not common to find a man like this in a city and when one is 





























































































32. "Anyone who is threatened and is forced by necessity either 
to act or to suffer becomes a very dangerous man to the 
Prince" (Discourses 111,6,359).
33. Nota bene that this passage when read alongside the previous
one considerably mitigates Machiavelli's undeserved 
reputation for unqualifyingly asserting that "the ends
justify the means" —  which, incidentally, he never said.
34. "If one forms the habit of breaking laws for a good reason, 
later on they can be broken for bad reasons under the pretext 
of doing good." (Discourses 1,24,25).
35. So much so that he advised taking very ruthless action 
against surviving opponents to wipe the slate clean where the 
struggle for power had not already done so. (Prince,
VII,102). It is doubtful whether any modern ruler could act 
in this manner, pace Stalin and Hitler, and still 
successfully establish the grounds for a consensual
democratic order.
36. Cf. Dankwart Rustow, op.cit.
37. Although he frequently "explains away" deviant cases by
references to the pecularities of their republican
arrangements. For example, Venice often gets special
treatment as a different (and unique) type of regime.
38. Cf. Arendt Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems", 
Comparative Political Studies 1, 1 (April 1968), pp.3-44. 
Also Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems, 
Journal of Politics, 18(August 1956), pp. 392-405.
39. Where the emergent party system is highly fragmented (and 
where the chosen electoral system "ratifies" this 
multiplicity), majoritarian rotation may well be ruled out.
40. Machiavelli had great faith in the resurrective powers of 
political forces in "a city used to living in liberty... 
because such a city always has as a refuge, in any rebellion, 
the name of liberty and its ancient institutions, neither of 
which are ever forgotten either because of the passing of 
time or because of the bestowal of benefits" (Prince, V,91- 
92) .
41. "The Impact and Meaning of 'Non-Competitive, Non-Free and 
Insignificant' Elections in Authoritarian Portugal, 1933- 
1974", in G. Hermet, R. Rose and A. Rouquie (eds.) Elections 
Without Choice (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp.145-168.





























































































43. Up to and including the violent elimination of specially 
privileged and propertied groups. "Anyone wishing to set up a 
republic where there are many gentlemen cannot do so unless 
he first does away with all of them..." (Discourses 
1,55,278) .
44. The Modern Prince and Other Writings (New York: International 
Publishers, 1957), p.137. Gramsci's reasons for stressing the 
need for a collective-organized agent of transformation were 
slightly different than Machiavelli's . It was the need for a 
capacity for "long drawn out" action (as opposed to 
Machiavelli1s emphasis on immediacy and singular 
purposiveness) and for "organic" linkages to followers (as 
opposed to autonomy of movement) that appealed to Gramsci. 
Individual effort, the latter thought, could only result in 
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